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 Adopting Accountable Care Through the Medicare 
Framework 
Barbara J. Zabawa, Louise G. Trubek & Felice F. Borisy-Rudin 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By enacting the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 (ACA),1 Congress provoked change in the status quo in 
American health care delivery and payment.  Although challenged by 
conservative voices resistant to change, the ACA survived its recent 
constitutional challenge.2  Regardless of how Congress tries to amend 
the ACA in the future, one vestige of the ACA likely to remain at least 
in the marketplace, if not in the law, is the concept of accountable 
care.3  The ACA created two programs, the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program (MSSP)4 and the Pioneer Accountable Care Organization 
Model (“Pioneer”),5 which work in parallel to bring the concept of 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)6 to the Medicare program.  
At its core, the accountable care model matches payment for care 
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 1  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010).  
 2  Nat’l. Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603, 565 U.S. _____, (June 28, 
2012) (upholding the ACA’s individual mandate as constitutional within Congress’s 
taxing powers). 
 3  See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, New Medical Care Networks Show Savings, NY TIMES, 
Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/health/policy/medical-care-
networks-show-savings-study-finds.html. 
 4  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2010). 
 5  Notice, Medicare Program: Pioneer Accountable Care Organization Model: 
Request for Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 29249, 29250 (May 20, 2011). 
 6  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A). 
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with performance-based measures.7  This is a bold move away from 
current volume-based payment models.8 
This paper makes the case that the MSSP serves as a suitable 
launch pad for the accountable care movement.  In Part II, the 
Article explores the emergence of accountable care in two states with 
very different health care markets—Wisconsin and New Jersey.9  
Contrasting the health care markets of Wisconsin and New Jersey 
offers insight into the flexibility of the criteria offered by the MSSP, 
which will permit all states to adopt ACO models, regardless of their 
political or commercial environments. 
In Part III, the Article highlights some skepticism surrounding 
ACOs, particularly the fear of a second “managed care backlash” and 
the concern about abusive market practices.  In particular, some 
critics are concerned that under accountable care, providers will 
ultimately be forced to compromise quality of care to achieve cost 
savings, which may create a consumer backlash similar to the demise 
of managed care in the 1990s.10  Others express fear that ACOs will 
push provider consolidation, leading to higher health care costs 
because of more concentrated market power.11 
Part IV demonstrates how the MSSP addresses the concerns 
expressed by skeptics through patient-centered criteria, a legal 
roadmap to reduce market abuses, and a multi-tiered governance 
structure.  The section explores how the creators of the MSSP 
learned from the managed care and consumerism movements to 
improve the chances that ACOs will be sustainable and successful.12  
The patient-centered criteria are critical starting points for ACO 
success.  It is helpful to view the MSSP patient-centered criteria 
through the lens of Albert O. Hirschman’s “exit, voice, and loyalty.”13  
The authors propose that ACOs will not realize the full financial 
 
 7  AM. HOSP. ASS’N, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: AHA RESEARCH 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 3 (2010), available at http://www.aha.org/research/cor/content 
/aco_cp.pdf [hereinafter AHA RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT]. 
 8  76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67803 (Nov. 2, 2011) (noting that value-based purchasing 
is a concept that links payment directly to the quality of care provided). 
 9  These states were selected based on their variation in the organization of 
health care delivery. 
 10  See Blendon, infra Part III and note 99. 
 11  See Rosch, infra Part III and note 101. 
 12  See infra Part IV.A.1–4. 
 13  Albert O. Hirschman, Excerpt from Chapter Eight of EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: 
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970), in 24 SOC. CONT. 
272, 272 (1994) (discussing two polar options by which a person may respond to 
unsatisfactory circumstances: leave the situation or speak up for change). 
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benefit of investing in a value-based model without meaningful 
patient engagement.  The MSSP patient-centered criteria can help 
these organizations achieve necessary patient engagement and 
accomplish the triple aim of better health, better care, and reduced 
costs.14 
The MSSP legal roadmap includes safety zones to address 
antitrust and other market abuses.  This Article suggests that ACOs, 
regardless of their participation in the MSSP, should align as closely 
to the MSSP criteria as possible to avoid legal scrutiny.  The MSSP 
multi-tier system of governance can diffuse the ACO concept 
throughout the nation.  By using a national framework with vertical 
and horizontal dimensions, the MSSP can allow for variation in local 
ACOs while providing a mechanism for learning across ACOs 
regionally and nationally, which is currently occurring in Wisconsin 
and New Jersey.  Part V of this Article revisits Wisconsin and New 
Jersey, as well as the private market, to understand how the MSSP is 
impacting collaborative efforts in those markets. 
Part VI identifies challenges and gaps in the MSSP that leaders 
in government and the market need to address to ensure that ACOs 
continue to thrive and achieve the goals of better health, better care, 
and lower costs.15  As noted by Ezekiel Emanuel, there is an inevitable 
trade-off between rising health care costs and other public goods, 
such as access to college and good wages for working Americans.16  
Implemented cohesively and comprehensively, the MSSP has the 
potential to free up the significant resources currently spent on 
health care so that Americans can benefit from other public goods 
while not sacrificing their health. 
II. THE CASE FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
A. Accountable Care Pays for Value 
No one on either side of the political aisle contends that the 
United States health care system is optimally cost efficient.  Health 
care spending in the United States amounted to $2.6 trillion in 2010, 
or 17.9 percent of the entire Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and is 
 
 14  See infra Part II.A and note 24. 
 15  See infra Part VI and note 264. 
 16  Ezekiel J. Emanuel, What We Give Up for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012, 
5:41 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/what-we-give-up-for-
health-care/ (arguing that controlling health care costs is a necessary trade-off in 
order to maintain other public goods, such as education and national strength).  
ZABAWA ET AL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2012  2:27 PM 
1474 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1471 
 
anticipated to rise to about $4.6 trillion, or 19.8 percent of the GDP 
by 2020.17  Researchers have shown that the United States health 
system lacks quality, particularly in contrast to other industrialized 
countries.18  According to one source, one major cause of these 
problems is that current payment systems encourage volume-driven 
care, rather than value-driven care.19  That is, providers “gain 
increased revenues and profits by delivering more services to more 
people, fueling inflation in health care costs without any 
corresponding improvement in outcomes.”20  The volume-based 
system also unfortunately penalizes providers financially for 
accomplishing the laudable goals of keeping people healthy, 
reducing errors and complications, and avoiding unnecessary care.21  
As a result of these persistent problems, there is general agreement 
that the cost of health care has risen to untenable levels and is 
threatening the future of Medicare and the economic well-being of 
the United States.22 
One solution to the high cost, low quality dilemma is 
accountable care provided by ACOs.23  As noted by Thomas Greaney, 
“ACOs offer a much-needed vehicle for integrating health care 
delivery and reducing the well-documented shortcomings of the 
system that are attributable to payment and organizational features 
 
 17  HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTHCARE COSTS: A PRIMER (May 2012), 
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7670-03.pdf; CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2010 HIGHLIGHTS (last visited Oct. 
6, 2012), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads 
/highlights.pdf; CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2010 – 2020 (last visited Oct. 6, 2012), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/proj2010.pdf; see also David 
Blumenthal, Performance Improvement in Health Care—Seizing the Moment, 366 N. ENGL. 
J. MED. 1953, 1954 (2012) (projecting health care spending to be 20.1% of GDP in 
2021 and setting a goal for the federal government to “reduce national health care 
expenditures by $893 billion over 10 years” in order to hold health care spending to 
less than 19% of GDP). 
 18  See T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER, 
AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE 31 (2009); Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better 
Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1418 (2009). 
 19  Miller, supra note 18, at 1418.  
 20  Id.  
 21  Id. 
 22  Alex D. Federman et al., Physicians’ Opinions About Reforming Reimbursement: 
Results of a National Survey, 170 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1735, 1735 (2010), available at 
http://acpinternist.acponline.org/sir/docs/rm/journal/federman_phys.pdf.   
 23  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A). 
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that reward high volume rather than low cost or high quality.”24 
There is no precise definition of accountable care, but health 
industry leaders have attributed the concept to Dr. Elliott Fisher.25  In 
a 2006 Health Affairs article, Dr. Fisher described the development of 
partnerships between hospitals and physicians to coordinate and 
deliver efficient care.26  According to the American Hospital 
Association, the ACO concept seeks to remove existing barriers to 
improve the value of care.27  The most significant barrier that the 
ACO concept seeks to remove is a payment system that rewards the 
volume and intensity of provided services instead of quality and cost 
performance.28  A related, yet independently substantial, barrier that 
the ACO system seeks to remove is the widely held assumption that 
more medical care is equivalent to higher quality care.29  Others have 
defined accountable care organizations as “affiliations of health care 
providers that are held jointly accountable for achieving 
improvements in the quality of care and reductions in spending.”30 
The ACA aimed to establish the MSSP by January 1, 2012, in 
order to “promote[] accountability for a patient population, 
coordinate[] items and services under [Medicare] Parts A and B, and 
encourage[] investment in infrastructure and redesigned care 
processes for high quality and efficient service delivery.”31  The MSSP 
final regulations, issued on November 2, 2011, define “accountable 
care organization (ACO)” as a legal entity that is (1) recognized and 
authorized under applicable State, Federal, or tribal law, (2) 
identified by a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN), and (3) 
formed by one or more ACO participants that are defined in § 
425.102(a) and may also include any other ACO participants 
 
 24  Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 364 
N. ENGL. J. MED. e1 (Jan. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1013404; see also Federman et al., 
supra note 22, at 1735 (noting that accountable care is gaining considerable 
attention as a mechanism to “‘bend the cost curve’ of health care expenditures while 
maintaining or improving health care quality”).   
 25  AHA RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7. 
 26  Id. (citing Elliott Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The 
Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44 (2006)).  
 27  AHA RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7 (citing Elliott Fisher et al., 
Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF. W219 
(2009), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/28/2/w219). 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Greaney, supra note 24. 
 31  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1). 
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described in § 425.102(b).32  Upon meeting certain requirements, 
groups of service providers and suppliers that have established a 
mechanism for shared governance are eligible to participate as 
ACOs.33  Participation in the MSSP is voluntary.34  The MSSP allows 
groups of providers and suppliers to work together to manage and 
coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries.35  Once 
formed, the ACO becomes “accountable for the quality, cost, and 
overall care of the Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to 
the ACO.”36 
In conjunction with the MSSP, the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services launched the Pioneer ACO model, which 
parallels the MSSP program in many ways, but was constructed from 
the outset to be a limited term experiment “to test the effectiveness of 
a particular model of payment.”37  Like the MSSP, Pioneer aimed to 
meet “the three-part aim of better health, better health care, and 
lower per-capita costs for Medicare, Medicaid and Children’s Health 
Insurance Program beneficiaries.”38  However, in contrast to the 
 
 32  42 C.F.R. § 425.20.  42 CFR § 425.102(a) includes ACO professionals in group 
practice arrangements; networks of individual practices of ACO professionals; 
partnerships or joint venture arrangements between hospitals and ACO 
professionals; hospitals employing ACO professionals; Critical Access Hospitals that 
bill under Method II (as described in 42 CFR § 413.70(b)(3)); Rural Health Centers; 
and Federally Qualified Health Centers.  Id.  42 CFR § 425.102(b) states that other 
“ACO participants that are not identified in paragraph (a) of this section are eligible 
to participate through an ACO formed by one or more of the ACO participants 
identified in paragraph (a) of this section.”  42 C.F.R. § 425.102(b).  Note that an 
“ACO professional” is defined as “an ACO provider/supplier who is either” a 
physician (doctor of medicine or doctor of osteopathy), a physician’s assistant, a 
nurse practitioner, or a clinical nurse specialist.  42 C.F.R. § 425.20.  Also, the 
definition of hospital limits “hospital,” for the purposes of the MSSP, to those 
hospitals “subject to the prospective payment system specified in § 412.1(a)(1).”  
Social Security Act §§ 1899(b)(1)(A)–(E); 42 C.F.R. § 425.102(a)–(b).   
 33  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(1). 
 34  See 42 C.F.R. § 425.100 (which uses the permissive word “may” in regard to 
participation of ACO providers in the Shared Savings Program).  See also 42 C.F.R. §§ 
425.200, 425.202 (outlining terms of the participation agreement, and outlining 
application procedures). 
 35  See 42 C.F.R. §§ 425.100, 425.200, 425.202. 
 36  See id. 
 37  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PIONEER ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATION MODEL: GENERAL FACT SHEET (Dec. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.cap.org/apps/docs/statline/pdf/pioneer_aco_fact_sheet.pdf 
[hereinafter PIONEER GENERAL FACT SHEET].  Pioneer comes out of the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, which received its mandate through the ACA 
amendment to section 1115 of the Social Security Act and was created as of January 
1, 2011.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (amended by ACA § 3021 (2010)). 
 38  Notice, Medicare Program: Pioneer Accountable Care Organization Model: 
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MSSP, the Pioneer ACO was designed to rapidly move large health 
care organizations to population-based payment arrangements.39  
Pioneer’s main purpose is “to support vanguard organizations” in 
ongoing processes of transformation already entered into by the 
organizations.40  Most significantly, Pioneer ACOs were required to 
commit “to entering outcomes-based contracts with other purchasers 
(private health plans, state Medicaid agencies, and/or self-insured 
employers) such that the majority of the ACO’s total revenues 
(including from Medicare) [would] be derived from such 
arrangements, by the end of the second performance period in 
December 2013.”41  In creating the Pioneer ACO model, the Center 
for Innovation chose to focus on large health care organizations, with 
at least “15,000 aligned beneficiaries” for the non-rural ACOs and 
greater than 5,000 beneficiaries for the rural ACOs.42  Consequently, 
the Pioneer ACOs were expected to already have the necessary legal 
structure to permit receipt and distribution of incentive payments 
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).43 
ACOs can take a variety of organizational forms, such as 
integrated delivery systems, primary care or multispecialty medical 
groups, hospital-based systems, and contractual or virtual networks of 
 
Request for Applications, 76 Fed.Reg. 29249, 29250 (May 20, 2011). 
 39  PIONEER GENERAL FACT SHEET, supra note 37. 
 40  Pioneer Accountable Care Organization (ACO) Model Request for Application, CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID INNOVATION I.B (released May 17, 2011), available at 
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/x/Pioneer-ACO-Model-Request-For-Applications-
document.pdf [hereinafter Pioneer Request]; see also Pioneer ACO Model, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/ACO/Pioneer 
/index.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 41  Pioneer Request, supra note 40 at II.I. 
 42  Id. at I.E. 
 43  See id. at II.C.  The ACA also set up the Independence at Home Medical 
Practice Demonstration Program that uses “home-based primary care teams.”  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1395cc-5, amended by ACA § 3024 (2010).  Section 3502 of the ACA provides 
for the Secretary of Health and Human Services “to provide grants to or enter into 
contracts with eligible entities to establish community based interdisciplinary, 
interprofessional [health] teams . . . to support primary care practices” and to 
“integrate clinical and community preventive and health promotion services for 
patients.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 256a-1 (West 2010).  The grants may be used to help 
develop the interdisciplinary teams and/or to provide capitated payments.  Id.  The 
ACA also provides for a state option under Medicaid to provide “health homes” to 
individuals with chronic conditions, whereby the “health home” will provide 
“coordination with a team of health care professionals.”  42 U.S.C. 1396w-4, amended 
by ACA § 2703 (2010) (provides a “State option to provide coordinated care through 
a health home for individuals with chronic conditions,” whereby the “health home” 
will provide medical assistance care through Medicaid). 
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physicians, such as independent practice associations.44  However, all 
ACOs, share a common goal to reduce costs while improving quality 
in health care through better coordination and collaboration.45  
ACOs reward physicians for collaborating to increase prevention and 
the quality of care, “while discouraging overtreatment, 
undertreatment, and sheer profiteering.”46  “Reducing the 
fragmented provision of care through improvements in care 
coordination and continuity of care may be necessary” before value-
based payment strategies can “successfully contribute to improved 
health care and cost savings.”47 
B. The Emergence of an Accountable Care Movement 
The accountable care movement has emerged at the local level 
over a period of time, albeit through varying mechanisms and at 
different paces.  One sees two distinct examples of accountable care 
emergence in Wisconsin and New Jersey. 
l. The Wisconsin Story 
The Wisconsin health care market has a rich culture of 
collaboration, which creates an environment ripe for accountable 
care.48  Integrated delivery systems are prominent in Wisconsin.49  
These integrated systems, by definition, collaborate with other types 
of health care stakeholders, such as payers, physicians, and acute care 
institutions like hospitals.50  The authors interviewed several 
Wisconsin providers for this Article, and all were part of an integrated 
system: UW Health,51 Marshfield Clinic,52 Dean Health System,53 and 
 
 44  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b); see also Greaney, supra note 24. 
 45  See Greaney, supra note 24. 
 46  Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town can Teach us About 
Health Care, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 1, 12, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?curren
tPage=all. 
 47  Federman et al., supra note 22, at 1740. 
 48  Legislative Symposium, ACO Innovators: Health System Transformation in 
Wisconsin, Evidence-Based Health Policy Project (Feb. 22, 2012), available at 
http://uwphi.pophealth.wisc.edu/programs/health-policy/ebhpp/events/index 
.htm [hereinafter ACO Innovators Symposium]. 
 49  See John S. Toussaint et al., Connecting Statewide Health Information Technology 
Strategy to Payment Reform, 17 AM. J. MANAG.CARE e80, e86 (2011), available at 
http://www.wchq.org/news/documents/3-18-11_AJMC_Article.pdf; Joe Vanden Plas 
et al., Health Care Roundtable, IN BUS.: MADISON, Feb. 2012, at 44, 47–48. 
 50  ACO Innovators Symposium, supra note 48. 
 51  Interview with Jonathan Jaffery, Medical Director, UW Health Delivery System 
Innovation, University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, in 
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the Monroe Clinic.54  In addition, the authors attended a presentation 
given by a panel of Wisconsin health system leaders that included two 
additional systems not interviewed: Bellin-ThedaCare Healthcare 
Partners (Bellin) and Gundersen Lutheran Health System 
(Gundersen Lutheran).55  Both of these organizations shared the 
same integrated system characteristic as the interviewed systems.56 
Each system has strong affiliations or partnerships with at least 
one hospital; each has its own employed physician groups, which 
includes both primary care and specialists; and all but two have their 
own health plans as part of their systems.57  In addition, none of the 
systems were novices with electronic medical records (EMRs); each 
system has an EMR that it has been using for many years.58  An EMR is 
a key ingredient in a successful value-based system of care.59 
Representatives of many of the Wisconsin systems professed that 
they are already providing “accountable care.”  For example, Dr. Jeff 
 
Madison, Wis. (Sept. 19, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Jaffery Interview].  
 52  Interview with Paul Van Den Heuvel, Associate General Counsel, Marshfield 
Clinic, in Madison, Wis. (Sept. 26, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Van Den 
Heuvel Interview]. 
 53  Interview with Craig Samitt, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Dean Health 
System, in Madison, Wis. (Oct. 20, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Samitt 
Interview]. 
 54  Interview with Mike Sanders, Chief Exec. Officer, Monroe Clinic, in Monroe, 
Wis. (Dec. 21, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sanders Interview]. 
 55  ACO Innovators Symposium, supra note 48. 
 56  Id. 
 57  UW Health’s insurance arm is Unity Health Insurance, Dean Health System’s 
insurance arm is Dean Health Plan, Marshfield Clinic’s insurance arm is Security 
Health Plan, and Gundersen’s plan is Gundersen Lutheran Health Plan. ACO 
Innovators Symposium, supra note 48. 
 58  UW Health, Dean, Bellin, and Monroe Clinic all use Epic, which is based in 
Madison, Wisconsin, while Marshfield Clinic and Gundersen built their own 
electronic medical record systems which have been in place for twenty years.  Jaffery 
Interview, supra note 51; Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52; Samitt Interview, 
supra note 53; Sanders Interview, supra note 54; George Kerwin, Chief Exec. Officer, 
Bellin, Presentation at ACO Innovators Symposium (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter 
Kerwin Presentation]; Jeff Thompson, Chief Exec. Officer, Gundersen Lutheran, 
Presentation at ACO Innovators Symposium (Feb. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Thompson 
Presentation].  
 59  But see Clifford Goodman, Savings in Electronic Medical Record Systems?  Do it for 
the Quality, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1124, 1126 (2005) (“The capacity for transformation will 
arise when this system enables new forms of high-speed, broadly integrated data 
collection, analysis, and knowledge development and transfer in a value-based health 
care market.”); James M. Walker, Electronic Medical Records and Health Care 
Transformation, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1118, 1120 (2005) (noting the need for “powerful 
financial incentives—such as pay-for-performance—that will reward organizations for 
using EMRs to improve the quality and efficiency of U.S. health care”). 
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Thompson stated that Gundersen Lutheran already has various 
insured populations for which the system is accountable.60  
Gundersen Lutheran developed a care coordination program that 
assigned a social worker to manage the care of the top one percent of 
patients, measured by resource consumption.61  This care 
coordination includes addressing social issues of the patient.62  
Unfortunately, this program is not compatible with the current 
payment system, causing Gundersen Lutheran to lose approximately 
$10 million in charges each year that the system could otherwise bill.63  
Dr. Craig Samitt similarly noted that Dean Health System already 
functions as an ACO through its integrated delivery system.64  Dean’s 
physicians, hospital, and health plan are “working collaborations” 
that “maximize quality and outcomes without overspending the 
patient’s resources.”65  According to Dr. Samitt, “[a]ccountable care is 
a delivery system objective, not a payer contract.”66  Dr. Jonathan 
Jaffery pointed out that UW Health has a quality and safety 
infrastructure that has been in place for a long time and that 
Wisconsin has good reporting systems that function to hold providers 
accountable.67  Mike Sanders explained that the Monroe Clinic 
participates in the Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare Quality 
(WCHQ) and views its participation as a method of measuring quality 
benchmarks on certain chronic diseases.68 
Indeed, each of the Wisconsin systems highlighted in this Article 
are part of the Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare Quality, which 
“comprises twenty-seven organizations, representing most of 
Wisconsin’s physicians.”69  The WCHQ came into being in 2002 
through the efforts of one physician leader, Dr. John Toussaint, CEO 
of ThedaCare, who wanted to address the “crisis in healthcare quality 
and the growing drumbeat for reform.”70  Dr. Toussaint invited the 
leaders from Dean Health System, Gundersen Lutheran, Bellin 
Health, and Marshfield Clinic, as well as leaders from eight major 
 
 60  Thompson Presentation, supra note 58.  
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Samitt Interview, supra note 53.   
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Jaffery Interview, supra note 51. 
 68  Sanders Interview, supra note 54. 
 69  Toussaint, supra note 49, at e81. 
 70  Id. at e80. 
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employers from Wisconsin, to “explore the possibility of using quality 
reporting to improve healthcare.”71  The WCHQ currently partners 
with business coalitions, consumer advocates, governmental agencies, 
foundations, and healthcare associations to gain a more balanced 
and complete understanding of what the current state of health care 
is and how it can be improved.72  The WCHQ provides an opportunity 
for a broad spectrum of stakeholders, many of which compete with 
one another, to share best practices and gain valuable perspectives.73  
Through a collaborative effort, the WCHQ developed clinical 
performance data that consumers can use to compare certain quality 
measures across competing organizations.74  Thus, the WCHQ not 
only demonstrates that collaboration may be a more powerful tool 
than competition, but also the advantage in giving consumers tools to 
have more “skin in the [health care] game.”75 
Chris Queram, the current CEO of the WCHQ, attributes the 
collaborative spirit among Wisconsin health care competitors to a 
systematic dismantling of the regulatory model that occurred 
approximately twenty years ago.76  Wisconsin eliminated regulatory 
 
 71  Id. at e80–e81. 
 72  Id. at e81. 
 73  Id. at e81.  
 74  Id. at e81–e83.  The WCHQ posts clinical performance data on a website.  
Toussaint supra note 49, at e81; View Our Reports, WISCONSIN COLLABORATIVE FOR 
HEALTHCARE QUALITY, http://www.wchq.org/reporting/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).  
Initial results from the performance compilation showed significant variations in 
costs and quality.  Most surprising to the hospital administrators was an inverse 
relationship between costs and quality—”higher cost hospitals were less likely to meet 
benchmarks for quality.”  Merrill Goozner, Quality, Economy, Transparency: A New 
Health Care Code, FISCAL TIMES (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Issues/Health-Care/2010/05/10/How-A-Wisconsin-
Program-Can-Save-Americas-Health-Care-System.aspx.  Wisconsin hospitals 
responded to the data reporting by seeking to improve both quality performance 
and cost measures.  Id.  Collaborative efforts among competitors to publish pricing 
terms within the Wisconsin healthcare industry could, however, be viewed as 
collusion if it were to increase prices or decrease available health care options.  See id. 
(citing Michael Cowie, former Federal Trade Commission official).  The results 
noticed in Wisconsin are not unusual.  Atul Gawande noticed a similar pattern in 
Texas.  See Gawande, supra note 46. 
 75  Jaffery Interview, supra note 51; Samitt Interview, supra note 53.  “Skin in the 
game” is a phrase coined by Warren Buffet that refers to insiders investing within the 
same company that they manage.  INVESTOPEDIA FINANCIAL DICTIONARY, 
http://www.answers.com/topic/skin-in-the-game (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).  In the 
healthcare context, it refers to patients investing in their own health, through 
healthcare decision-making, healthy life style choices, and copayments.  Id. 
 76  Interview with Chris Queram, Chief Exec. Officer, Wisconsin Collaborative for 
Healthcare Quality, in Madison, Wis. (Feb. 20, 2012) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Queram Interview]. 
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structures such as the Certificate of Need and rate review of 
insurers.77  In exchange for eliminating these forms of government 
regulation, the Wisconsin Hospital Association agreed to a 
requirement that hospitals submit discharge data to the Wisconsin 
Office of Healthcare Information so that the state and other 
stakeholders would have tools to review the health care market.78  
Almost ten years elapsed before this dataset was used for public 
reporting.  Once begun, the public reporting created a dynamic 
change in the Wisconsin health care culture from what had been an 
attitude of “denial” by health care providers to one of providers 
wanting to “get out in front of the data” and “at least” meet the 
reporting “half-way.”79  Thus, although the government moved away 
from direct control of the health care market, the demand for 
transparency in the form of public information encouraged self-
regulation and education between providers.80 
Dr. Toussaint took the initiative to create the WCHQ because he 
recognized an unacceptable variability in physician quality data.81  As 
Medical Director for Touchpoint Health Plan, Dr. Toussaint became 
familiar with HEDIS® data82 and was concerned when he learned that 
the standard of care differed between people in Medicare, Medicaid, 
and the Touchpoint private plans.83  According to Mr. Queram, Dr. 
Toussaint “wanted to build a performance model for all patients 
regardless of payer.”84  To do that, he needed other providers to 
participate so that there could be valuable benchmarks against which 
to measure each of the participants.85  And, in order for this effort to 
have credibility in the market, he recognized that the business 
community needed to play an active role in its development.  Trust 
and cooperation developed slowly.  Mr. Queram explains that it took 
more than a year for the providers and the business partners to 
develop trust and to find “common ground” and “aspirations . . . to 
 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
 82  HEDIS® is a healthcare performance measurement tool, provided by the 
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) that “consists of 76 measures 
across 5 domains of care” and “is used by more than 90% of America’s health plans.”  
WHAT IS HEDIS?, NCQA, http://www.ncqa.org/tabid/187/Default.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2012). 
 83  Queram Interview, supra note 76. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
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build a measurement method that works.”86  As noted above, 
participation in the WCHQ has, for some providers, been the vehicle 
by which they measure and demonstrate the provision of accountable 
care in Wisconsin.87 
2. The New Jersey Story 
In contrast to the prevalence of integrated systems in Wisconsin, 
New Jersey’s healthcare market consists mainly of small physician 
practices.88  Ten years ago, in 2002, more than sixty percent of New 
Jersey physicians practiced solo or in small, private two- to five-person 
groups.89  New Jersey has remarkably few private multi-specialist 
groups, and its smaller physician groups tend to be fragmented and 
non-collaborative.90 
  Yet despite fragmented physician groups, New Jersey has 
initiatives that are arguably precursors of ACOs.  There are 
collaboratives to improve patient safety in the Intensive Care Unit 
and to decrease rapid response times.91  Disease-based collaboratives 
are working together to decrease pressure ulcers and to improve 
perinatal care.92  In 2009, under the auspices of the New Jersey 
Hospital Association (NJHA), CMS funded a three-year gain-sharing 
pilot project.93  The New Jersey Care Integration Consortium provides 
quality monitoring for improved performance.94  All members must 
 
 86  Id. 
 87  Toussaint, supra note 49, at e81. 
 88  Seminar, NJ Off. Legis. Serv., Rutgers Ctr. for State Health Pol’y, The New Jersey 
Physician Workforce: Findings from the NJ State Physician Census (Oct. 27, 2004), available 
at www.cshp.rutgers.edu/PDF/CSHP_OLS/OLSNJPhysCensus.pdf; see also Kevin 
Post, Shore Physicians Group Offers Multispecialty Care, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (March 
13, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/communities/northfield 
_linwood_somers-point/shore-physicians-group-offers-multispecialty-care/article 
_2292e0a0-6d56-11e1-bcfd-0019bb2963f4.html. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Stephen Jones, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Robert Wood Johnson 
University Hospital System, Academic Medical Centers and ACOs: Partners in Success or 
Rivals for Attention in the New Enviroment?, Presentation at the University of Miami 
Global Business Forum: The Business of Health Care: Defining the Future (Jan. 12–
14, 2011), available at http://www.bus.miami.edu/_assets/files/gbf-2011/Jones.pdf,.  
 91  Internal Memorandum from Elizabeth A. Ryan, President and Chief Exec. 
Officer, N.J. Hosp. Assoc., to other N.J. Hosp. Assoc. Officers (Sept. 9, 2011) (on file 
with author). 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Sean Hopkins, Sr. Vice President, Health Economics, N.J. Hosp. Assoc., 
Address at the NJ HIMSS Spring Event “Health Care Reform School”: The National 
Healthcare Reform Law—What it means to the New Jersey Healthcare Community 
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participate in the quality collaboratives.95  All participating hospitals 
have a consumer on the board and there is an overall steering 
committee with a quality oversight group.96  Hospital and physician 
incentives are aligned.97  The elaborate incentive system is bonus only 
and is based on individual performance with no change in current 
payments from payers.98 
III. ACO SKEPTICISM 
Not everyone is enthusiastic about the move toward ACOs.  It is 
not yet clear whether ACOs will deliver the promised higher-quality, 
lower-cost system promised.  The source of ACO critics’ skepticism 
derives from two complementary perspectives based on the history of 
efforts to coordinate care and reduce costs.  First, critics point to the 
disappointing managed care experience in the 1990s,99 and fear that 
if ACOs focus on keeping costs low without significantly improving 
access and quality, the ACO movement will be destined to the same 
fate as managed care.100 
Second, critics fear that collaborative efforts can be abused, 
misused, and can create a euphemism for anticompetitive conduct.101  
For example, Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch of the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) believes that the net result of the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program may be higher costs and lower quality health 
care, precisely the opposite of the program’s goal.102  From an 
antitrust standpoint, greater collaboration creates greater potential 
 
(May 26, 2010), PowerPoint presentation available at 
http://njhimss.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=116:njhimss-
spring-eventqhealthcare-reform-schoolq&catid=65:past-events&Itemid=115. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Sean Hopkins, Sr. Vice President Health Economics, Presentation at the N.J. 
Hosp. Assoc. N.J. Care Integration Consortium: Overview and Implementation (May 
26, 2010).  
 98  Letter from Elizabeth A. Ryan, President & CEO, N.J. Hosp. Assoc., to Chief 
Executive Officers, Chief Operating Officers, Chief Financial Officers, Government 
Relations Officers, N.J. Hosp. Assoc. (Sept. 9, 2011) (on file with author). 
 99  Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash, 17 HEALTH 
AFF. 80, 81 (1998), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/17/4 
/80.full.pdf+html. 
 100  Blendon et al., supra note 99, at 80. 
 101  J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed.Trade Comm’n., Accountable Care 
Organizations: What Exactly Are We Getting?,  at 15, Speech at the Am. Bar Assoc. 
Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum (Nov. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/111117fallforumspeech.pdf. 
 102  Id. 
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for market manipulation, which could further drive up health care 
costs.103 
Critics worry that ACOs are nothing but a revival of the managed 
care organizations (MCOs) that ultimately proved unpopular in the 
last part of the twentieth century.104  In 1998, Robert Blendon wrote 
that a majority of Americans expressed concern that managed care 
might deny people the services they need when they are very sick.105  
Others wrote that managed care eroded the trust between health care 
organizations and consumers because of consumers’ fear “of being 
exploited by health care organizations furthering their self-
interest.”106  For example, Mark Schlesinger argued that a prepaid 
health plan that responds solely to financial incentives will allocate its 
resources in ways that minimize its expected medical costs, consistent 
with maintenance of a stable set of satisfied enrollees.107  The 
following brief history of managed care and the consumerism 
movement provides perspective for understanding the ACO 
movement. 
A. History of Managed Care and Consumerism 
In the early 1980s, MCOs emerged out of concern with rising 
costs of health care.108 Congress passed the Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) Act of 1973109 in response to a call by former 
President Richard Nixon to address the rising cost of health care 
before it crippled the productivity of the United States.110  The ideal 
model was a strong central managing organization that controlled 
access to care and restricted the work of health care professionals.111  
 
 103  Id. 
 104  Final Rule, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care 
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67805 (Nov. 2, 2011) [hereinafter MSSP Final 
Rule]; see also Blendon, supra note 99. 
 105  Blendon, supra note 99, at 84.   
 106  Mark Schlesinger et al., A Broader Vision for Managed Care, Part 2: A Typology of 
Community Benefits, 17 HEALTH AFF. 26, 34 (1998), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/17/5/26.full.pdf+html. 
 107  Id. at 33.  For example, Schlesinger notes that “HMOs with these motives thus 
have little incentive to address problems of substance abuse aggressively—they do 
not bear the bulk of the costs and would prefer having enrollees with these problems 
become dissatisfied and switch to another plan.”  Id.  This behavior exacerbates the 
burden of substance abuse for the community as a whole.  Id. 
 108  Edward Richards, The Rise of MCOs, Public Health Law Map, LSU LAW CTR., 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/TheRiseofMCOs.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 109  42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (1973). 
 110  Richards, supra note 108. 
 111  See, e.g., Ronald Lagoe et al., Current and Future Developments in Managed Care in 
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This model required gatekeeping and capitation (a fixed sum for a 
package of services), and included substantial cost-saving incentives.112  
Physicians were the major losers: they felt demeaned and frustrated 
by the dual losses of autonomy and income.113  Patients were fearful 
that the new system focused too much on controlling costs instead of 
delivering services.114  For example, the media reported that MCOs 
paid physicians bonuses for limiting patients’ health care use.115  
Physicians helped fuel this fear.116 
The fear and criticism of managed care led to the introduction 
both in Congress and in state legislatures of more than a thousand 
bills dealing with consumer protection in managed care.117  Many 
labeled these laws as the Patients’ Bill of Rights and they were 
enacted in many states.118  These documents aimed to create a more 
humane managed care system by influencing the internal structures 
of the MCOs and using data-driven evaluation systems.119  The 
 
the United States and Implications for Europe, 2005 HEALTH RES. POL’Y & SYSTEMS (March 
17, 2005), available at http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/3/1/4. 
 112  See Christopher B. Forrest, Primary Care Gatekeeping and Referrals: Effective Filter 
or Failed Experiment?, 326 BMJ 692, 692–95 (Mar. 29, 2003), available at 
http://www.bmj.com/content/326/7391/692.1.pdf%2Bhtml. 
 113  Hal Teitelbaum, Chief Exec. Officer, Crystal Run Healthcare, Presentation at 
Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: Implementing the Affordable Care Act: What 
Role for Accountable Care Organizations? (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 114  Lagoe et al., supra note 111. 
 115  Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ Attitudes Toward Cost Control Bonuses for 
Managed Care Physicians, 20 HEALTH AFF. 186, 186 (2001). 
 116  Mary Guptill Warren et al., The Impact of Managed Care on Physicians, 24 
HEALTH CARE MANAGE REV. 44, 44 (1999), available at 
http://www.public.asu.edu/~atssk/ssk_hcmr99.pdf. 
 117  Blendon, supra note 99, at 81; see generally Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et al., 
National Survey of Patients’ Bill of Rights Statutes, 24 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 489–94 (2009), 
available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/j4776732r66m8126/?MUD=MP. 
 118  Paasche-Orlow, supra note 117; Patient Rights, MEDLINE PLUS, U.S. NAT’L 
LIBRARY OF MED. (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/patientrights.html; Patient’s Bill of Rights, 
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, (Dec. 22, 2011).  For examples of how the United States 
government views the ACA as a Patients’ Bill of Rights, see Patients’ Bill of Rights, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.heatlhcare.gov/law/features/rights 
/bill-of-rights/index.html; Reducing Costs, Protecting Consumers: The Affordable Care Act 
on the One Year Anniversary of the Patient’s Bill of Rights, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Sept. 29, 
2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/law/resources/reports/patients-bill-of-
rights09232011a.html.  Interestingly, the American Hospital Association first 
proposed a Patient’s Bill of Rights in 1973.  G. J. Annas, A.H.A. Bill of Rights, 9 TRIAL 
59–61 (1973). 
 119  D. M. Nadzen et al., Data-driven Performance Improvement in Health Care: the Joint 
Commission’s Indicator Measurement System (IMSystem), 19 JT. COMM. J. QUAL. IMPROV. 
492–500 (1993), available at http://ukpmc.ac.uk/abstract/MED/8313012. 
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regulatory agencies retained oversight; but substantial governance 
was transferred to the MCOs and patients.120  The Patients’ Bill of 
Rights, supported by both physician and patient groups, softened a 
draconian system.121  The American Medical Association strongly 
supported the legislation.122  Government officials, MCOs, insurers, 
and large companies who paid for healthcare coverage and wanted to 
reduce the high cost of health care opposed the Patients’ Bill of 
Rights.123  The successful passage of the legislation taught the 
physicians about the power of the alliance of the patient groups and 
the physicians.124 
The mixed history of managed care led to the rise of the 
consumerist approach.  It is an alternative to managed care aimed at 
controlling costs and increasing choice in health care.125  One 
definition of consumerism is “individual choice within a health care 
marketplace characterized by the exchange of money for health care 
goods or services.”126  According to this theory, the consumer relies on 
information from many different sources, analogous to the consumer 
shopping in the supermarket.127  The consumerist approach tries to 
differentiate between the consumer and the supposedly passive 
patient of the past.128  It views the consumer as different from the 
 
 120  Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for 
Health Care, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
 121  See, e.g., Marin McDonald, Fighting Against the Evils of For-Profit Health Care: The 
Patients “Bill of Rights”, J. POVERTY AND PREJUDICE: SOCIAL SECURITY AT THE CROSSROADS 
(1999), available at http://www.stanford.edu/class/e297c/poverty_prejudice/soc_sec 
/fighting.htm. 
 122  The AMA issued its ethics opinion 10.01 in June 1992, advocating a Patient’s 
Bill of Rights, based on its report, Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician 
Relationship, 262 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. (1992), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics 
/opinion1001.page. 
 123  See Trubek, supra note 120; see also Reid, supra note 18, at 37 (explaining that 
“the money paid to doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies for treatment of insured 
patients is referred to as ‘medical loss’” by the “U.S. health insurance industry.”).  
The for-profit health insurance industry seeks to “maintain a medical loss ratio of 
about 80 percent.”  Reid, supra note 18, at 37.  
 124  See Kristin Madison, Patients as “Regulators”? Patients’ Evolving Influence over 
Health Care Delivery, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 9, 31–32 (2010), available at 
http://tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01947641003598195; Trubek, supra note 
120; see also Donald M. Berwick, ESCAPE FIRE: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF HEALTH 
CARE 51–55 (2002). 
 125  Madison, supra note 124. 
 126  Id. at 15. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. 
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patient, in that the patient is needy and dependent; while the 
consumer engages in sorting out his or her own preferences by 
gathering his or her own information.129  The consumer-patient 
gathers information from web-based sites such as WebMD® and 
health care report cards issued by private and public organizations, 
among other sources.130  Consumer-directed health care plans are 
another component of the consumerist approach.131  These plans 
feature high deductibles in exchange for lower premiums, requiring 
purchasers to act more like consumers.132 
These consumerist approaches allow patients to assert 
themselves in relation to the physician and also into the health care 
market.133  Once mechanisms like health care report cards and easy 
public reporting of outcomes emerged, reformist providers realized 
that engagement with patients was essential.134  By the time the ACA 
was written, active engagement with patients seemed to be an 
important strategy for reformist physicians.135 
Consumerism, however, has important limits.  By turning the 
patient into a consumer and health care into a business, it creates the 
potential for a “buyer beware” world.136  Additionally, it risks treating 
physicians as entrepreneurs rather than professionals bound by a 
 
 129  L. Rosenberg, Are Healthcare Leaders Ready for the Real Revolution?, 39 J. BEHAV. 
HEALTH. SERV. RES. 215–19 (2012).  But see PHILIP BREDESEN, FRESH MEDICINE: HOW TO 
FIX REFORM AND BUILD A SUSTAINABLE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 114–15 (2010). 
 130  See, e.g., WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2012); 
CHECKPOINT, http://www.wicheckpoint.org/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2012); 
Health Plan Report Card, NCQA,  
http://reportcard.ncqa.org/plan/external/plansearch.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 
2012). 
 131  Madison, supra note 124. 
 132  But see Paul Krugman, Patients are not Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011, at 
A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/opinion/22krugman.html. 
 133  Ronald E. Bachman, Healthcare Consumerism: The Basis of a 21st Century 
Intelligent Health System, CTR. FOR HEALTH TRANSFORMATION, 2–3 (2006), available at 
http://www.healthcarevisions.net/f/2006_Healthcare_Consumerism_CHT.pdf; see 
also WYE RIVER GROUP ON HEALTHCARE, AN EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTHCARE 
CONSUMERISM, 7–13 (2006), available at http://www.wrgh.org/docs/hc_consumerism 
_guide.pdf. 
 134  See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick, supra note 124; Atul Gawande, The Hot Spotters: 
Can We Lower Medical Costs by Giving the Neediest Patients Better Care?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 
24, 2011, at 40, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/01/24/110124fa_fact_gawande. 
 135  Madison, supra note 124, at 31–32. 
 136  See, e.g., Ha T. Tu & Jessica H. May, Self-Pay Markets In Health Care: Consumer 
Nirvana Or Caveat Emptor?, 26 HEALTH AFF. w217–w226 (2007), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/2/w217.full. 
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professional code of ethics.137  Finally, and most importantly, it 
assumes that the patient has the ability to be an active consumer.138  
Although the time when patients are most likely to engage the health 
care system is when they are ill, frail, and weak,139 a patient who is 
acutely ill may not be able to act as an active and intelligently 
involved consumer.140  For example, a patient who is being 
transported by ambulance for emergency medical care rarely gets to 
choose the hospital.141  Patients who are ill need support systems.  The 
consumerism movement, like managed care, did not sufficiently 
account for the difficulty in creating an effective role for 
consumers/patients within a complex health care system. 
The accountable care reformers are aware of the skepticism 
about patient involvement that remains from the previous efforts.142  
They learned from the managed care experience that patient support 
is essential for changing the delivery of medical care.143  The public 
reaction to the MCO tools—gatekeepers, financial incentives, and 
utilization management—resulted in both market resistance and 
legislation that watered down the model.144  Despite this watering 
down, many of the newly revised MCOs were successful, with many of 
the changes reducing costs and improving care.145  The reformers 
 
 137  See, e.g., Michael Anft, Hospital, Heal Thyself, 64 JOHNS HOPKINS MAG. 37, 38–39 
(2012) (reviewing MARTY MAKARY, UNACCOUNTABLE: WHAT HOSPITALS WON’T TELL 
YOU AND HOW TRANSPARENCY CAN REVOLUTIONIZE HEALTH CARE (2012)).  For a 
professional code for physicians, see, e.g., Code of Medical Ethics, AM. MEDICAL ASS’N, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).  As part of its code, the A.M.A. states that 
“the relationship between patient and physician is based on trust and gives rise to 
physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare above their own self-interest 
and above obligations to other groups, and to advocate for their patients’ welfare.” 
Opinion 10.015 - The Patient-Physician Relationship, AM. MEDICAL ASS’N (Dec. 21, 2001), 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/opinion10015.page? 
 138  Bachman, supra note 133; WYE RIVER GROUP ON HEALTHCARE, supra note 133. 
 139  See BREDESEN, supra note 129. 
 140  See id. at 15–16. 
 141  Instead, the choice of hospital is considered a medical decision to be made by 
professionals in accordance with a regional emergency medical services protocol.  
See, e.g., Emergency Patient Destinations and Hospital Diversion, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
HEALTH, http://www.health.ny.gov/nysdoh/ems/policy/06-01.htm (last visited Oct. 
6, 2012). 
 142  THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH 
POLICY: A CLINICAL APPROACH 199 (5th ed. 2009).   
 143  Id. 
 144  See generally, Mark A. Hall, The ‘Death’ of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 
J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 427 (2005). 
 145  Id. 
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learned from consumerism that information could lead to positive 
changes in healthcare and that technology allows for more 
transparency of information.146  The knowledge about system reform 
and the role of patients—learned from managed care and 
consumerism—contributed to the design of the MSSP.147 
B. Failed Promises of Higher Quality, Lower Costs 
In addition to fearing a repeat of the managed care debacle, 
other critics merely conclude that ACOs fall far short of presenting a 
panacea for health care.148  Some, such as Commissioner Rosch, have 
expressed concern that “even under the most optimistic scenario,” 
Medicare ACOs will only save the nation “less than one tenth of one 
percent of expected Medicare expenditures over the next decade.”149  
Jessica Mantel contends that in the long term, ACOs may achieve the 
goal of reducing health care costs by making “compromises in the 
quality of care they provide to patients, including withholding 
potentially beneficial care from some patients.”150  Mantel concedes 
that in the short-term, ACOs have the capacity to reduce wasteful care 
and better manage care of chronically ill patients.151  Nevertheless, 
Mantel argues that eliminating wasteful care will deny some patients 
beneficial care.152  She takes the position that managing chronic 
conditions may not be as cost-effective as expected because of 
increased administrative costs and greater utilization of services 
 
 146  For another review of the history of patient-centeredness, see MICHAEL L. 
MILLENSON & JULIANA MACRI,  URBAN INST., WILL THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MOVE 
PATIENT-CENTEREDNESS TO CENTER STAGE? (2012), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412524-will-the-affordable-care-act.pdf.  
 147  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 425). 
 148  See generally Jessica L. Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our 
Cake and Eat it Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393 (2012); Rosch, supra note 101. 
 149  Rosch, supra note 101, at 5 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 
VOL. I: HEALTH CARE 72–74 (Dec. 2008), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9925/12-18-HealthOptions.pdf).  
 150  Mantel, supra note 148. 
 151  Id.  Specifically, Mantel states that because of the financial incentives of 
“shared savings or higher margins under capitation,” there will likely be a reduction 
in “duplicative tests, unsafe procedures and care lacking in scientific support or 
sufficient value.”  Id. at 1406.  “The economic incentives of ACOs also will foster the 
adoption of protocols that reduce the risk of medical errors or complications.”  Id. at 
1411.  In addition, “[t]he financial incentives” of ACOs will “re-orient treatment of 
chronic conditions away from treating acute episodes of illness toward better 
prevention and patient management.”  Id. at 1413–14. 
 152  Id. at 1418. 
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through care coordination programs.153  Continuing advances in 
medical technology will require ACOs to find ways of lowering costs, 
which will be difficult for organizations that already have low 
operating costs without sacrificing quality.154  Finally, Mantel expresses 
concern that “in practice, some ACOs may stint on the care they 
provide patients given their financial incentives to do so” (i.e., there 
will always be “bad apples”).155 
Others have shared some of Mantel’s concerns that ACOs may 
not achieve the higher-quality, lower-cost goal in every case.156  For 
example, Donald Berwick has stated that ACOs in high-cost areas 
have greater potential for achieving cost savings than ACOs in lower-
cost areas.157  Such dismal outlooks are especially discouraging for 
highly integrated health care organizations, like those that exist in 
Wisconsin.  Such organizations view themselves as already operating 
leanly.158 
Another shortcoming of the ACO movement is the fear that the 
movement will push provider consolidation, further escalating the 
costs of health care.159  According to Greaney, “the ACO 
phenomenon may well encourage some mergers, joint ventures, and 
alliances that will exacerbate” the market concentration problem.160  
Economic evidence has shown that hospital consolidation in the 
1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at least five percent, and by 
forty percent or more when merging hospitals were located close to 
one another.161  Dominant providers can use their market power to 
seek higher reimbursements, as well as to deny employers and health 
plans the ability to obtain and use cost and quality data to enable 
them to shop more effectively.162 
 
 153  Mantel, supra note 148, at 1421–23. 
 154  Id. at 1425–26. 
 155  Id. at 1418. 
 156  Anna Wilde Mathews, Can Accountable-Care Organizations Improve Health Care 
While Reducing Costs?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204720204577128901714576054.h
tml (quoting Donald Berwick, former Administrator of the Ctrs. for Medicare and 
Medicaid Servs.). 
 157  Id. 
 158  See, e.g., Samitt Interview, supra note 53. 
 159  Greaney, supra note 24, at e1–e2. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Id. at e2 (citing C. H. Williams et al., How Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the 
Price and Quality of Hospital Care?, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (2006), 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/no9policybrief.pdf). 
 162  Greaney, supra note 24, at e2.  
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Indeed, in Wisconsin, seven health systems and a medical school 
have banded together to collaborate on an accountable care 
strategy.163  These systems represent twenty-eight hospitals in 
Wisconsin, Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, and northern Illinois as well 
as 4,000 affiliated physicians.164  These systems have combined net 
annual revenue of nearly $6 billion.165  This collaboration includes a 
significant number of hospitals and covers a wide geographic 
region.166  Although collaboration and coordination can be useful 
tools to improve health care quality and efficiency, it will be 
important for governing bodies to monitor ACO collaborations to 
ensure that the fears expressed by Mantel and Greaney are not 
realized. 
IV. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 
Arguably, the most prominent catalyst in the accountable care 
movement is the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP).167  The 
MSSP encourages or mandates the use of shared governance, 
information technology, multi-professional practitioners, financial 
incentives, benchmarks, metrics, and patient participation.168  The 
program requires population-based accountability, coordinated care, 
quality health care, and efficiency.169  It has the potential to transform 
the current volume-based system of health care to one based on 
value.170  The MSSP Final Rule provides elements that allow ACOs to 
succeed, whether inside or outside the MSSP umbrella. 
The MSSP Final Rule achieves two important goals: (1) it builds 
upon the success of a variety of pilot and experimental programs that 
have contained the essential elements of accountable care, such as 
those developed in Wisconsin and New Jersey,171 and (2) it answers 
 
 163  Competing Health Systems Launch Regional Partnership, WISCONSIN HEALTH NEWS 
(Mar. 20, 2012), http://wisconsinhealthnews.com/topstories/competing-health-
systems-launch-regional-partnership. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id. 
 167  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 425). 
 168  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), added by § 3022 of ACA. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Some projects that have provided proof of concept for components of the 
MSSP ACO include: Physician Group Practice (PGP), Medicaid Section 1115 Waiver, 
Section 1315 Waiver, Medicare Disproportionate Share Hospital Scheme, and 
Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration Programs.  See Social Security Act § 
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the skeptics’ concerns about collusion, excessive cost controls, 
inadequate quality, and ineffective patient engagement.172  The MSSP 
Final Rule provides answers to the concerns expressed in Part III of 
this Article through a multi-tiered framework that features patient-
centered criteria, a legal roadmap for anti-competitive behavior, and 
multi-tiered governance structures.173 
A. The MSSP Patient-Centered Criteria are Critical to ACO Success 
The ACO movement rethinks the role of the patient and other 
stakeholders in the delivery of healthcare, such as employers, 
insurers, and other community members.174  Generally, patient-
centered care improves outcomes by reducing length of stay, 
readmissions, and emergency department visits as well as enhancing 
patient compliance with plans of care.175  It also improves patient 
satisfaction.176  The comments to the MSSP rules indicate that CMS 
sees patient-centeredness as a crucial aspect to achieving its goals of 
better care, better health, and lower costs.177 
ACA mandates that the MSSP adopt a focus on patient-
centeredness that is promoted by three broad categories of rules: (1) 
patient representation in ACO governance, (2) patient engagement 
processes, and (3) quality measures that MSSP participants must meet 
in order to obtain shared savings.178 
 
1115, Pub. L. 105-33 (1997) (permitting the authorization of cost-neutral 
“experimental, pilot or demonstration project[s] . . . likely to assist in promoting the 
objectives of [the Medicaid statute]”); Benefits Improvement and Protection Act § 
412, Pub. L. 106-554 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2010) (providing a waiver for certain 
“experimental, pilot, or demonstration project[s]” that promote the objectives of 
care for vulnerable populations such as children, the blind, the disabled, and the 
elderly); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395ii (2003), added by the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act § 646, Pub. L. 108-173 (2003); Social Security 
Act § 1866C(b), added by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act § 646, Pub. L. 108-173 (2003), amended by ACA § 3021(c) (2010).   
 172  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67840-44. 
 173  See generally MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802. 
 174  In this Article, we use the word “patient” for clarity.  We have chosen to use 
patient to refer to all references to the person buying or receiving services except 
when we are specifically discussing consumerism.  
 175  Barbara Cliff, The Evolution of Patient-Centered Care, 57 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 86, 
88 (2012). 
 176  Id. 
 177  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67826 (defining “patient engagement” as 
“the active participation of patients and their families in the process of making 
medical decisions.”). 
 177  Id. 
 178   A defining event in the use of the term of “patient-centeredness” is the iconic 
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With regard to ACO governance, the final MSSP Rule requires at 
least one Medicare beneficiary representative served by the ACO to 
be on the ACO’s governing body.179  If an ACO is unable to satisfy the 
requirement of beneficiary representation on its governing body, the 
MSSP final rules allow ACOs to opt out of the requirement by 
providing an explanation for having a different composition of its 
governing body.180  Any ACO that does not meet the composition 
criteria must show that it is involving the ACO participants in 
innovative ways in ACO governance or that it is providing its 
Medicare beneficiaries with “meaningful representation in ACO 
governance.”181 
For the patient engagement processes, the MSSP requires ACOs 
to (1) regularly use a “patient experience of care survey,”182 (2) 
provide for a beneficiary representative on its governing body,183 (3) 
evaluate the health needs of its populations and develop plans to 
address those populations’ needs, to be achieved in part by 
partnering with community stakeholder organizations,184 (4) clearly 
communicate relevant “clinical knowledge/evidence-based medicine 
 
Institute of Medicine report issued in 2001, which identified patient-centeredness as 
one of the six key goals for health care delivery.  INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING 
THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 40 (2001).  The 
definitions of “patient-centeredness” vary—one is “health care that patients need and 
is provided when they need and in the manner they want.”  Karen David et al., 
Aiming High for the U.S. Health System: A Context for Health Reform, 36 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 629, 634–35 (2008).  Another definition propounded by the Institute of 
Medicine applies “patient-centeredness” to all patient interactions with physicians 
and the health care system as a whole.  Id. 
 179  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67821, 67976 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.106(c)(2)).  A “Medicare fee-for-service beneficiary” is one who is enrolled in 
original Medicare under Parts A and B, but who is not enrolled in a Medicare 
Advantage plan under Part C, “[a]n eligible organization under section 1876 of the 
Act,” or in “[a] PACE program under section 1894 of the Act.”  MSSP Final Rule, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 67974-75 (to be codified at 42 CFR § 425.20).  Also, that a single 
Medicare beneficiary on the governing body is sufficient to satisfy that component of 
the MSSP distinctly contrasts to the requirement that “[a]t least 75 percent control of 
the ACO’s governing body must be held by ACO participants.”  MSSP Final Rule, 76 
Fed. Reg. 67976 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 CFR § 425.106(c)(3)).   
 180  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67976 (to be codified at 42 CFR § 
425.106(c)(5)). 
 181  Id. (emphasis added). 
 182  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67976-77, 67984 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 
425.112(b)(2)(i), 425.500). 
 183  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.112(b)(2)(ii)). 
 184  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.112(b)(2)(iii)). 
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to beneficiaries” in a way that the beneficiaries can understand,185 (5) 
involve each individual beneficiary in a process of “shared decision-
making” that reflects that person’s “unique needs, preferences, 
values, and priorities,”186 (6) develop “written standards for 
beneficiary access and communication,” including a process by which 
beneficiaries may access their own medical records,187 and (7) develop 
an “individualized care program” for beneficiaries in high risk groups 
to provide for coordinated care throughout an episode of care and 
during its transitions.188 
The third patient-centered category relates to the MSSP quality 
measures.  The MSSP contains thirty-three quality performance 
standards that ACOs must meet before obtaining shared savings.189  
Of the thirty-three quality measures selected for the MSSP, seven are 
related to the patient’s or caregiver’s experience of care, to which the 
final rules give equal weight with measures relating to care 
coordination and patient safety, preventive health, and at-risk 
populations.190  The seven patient experience measures are: (1) 
“Getting Timely Care, Appointments and Information”; (2) “How 
Well Your Doctors Communicate”; (3) “Patients’ Rating of Doctor”; 
(4) “Access to Specialists”; (5) “Health Promotion and Education”; 
(6) “Shared Decision Making”; and (7) “Health Status/Functional 
Status.”191 
Another quality measure worthy of mention is the adoption and 
use of Electronic Health Records (EHR) technology.  The final MSSP 
 
 185  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.112(b)(2)(iv)). 
 186  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.112(b)(2)(v)). 
 187  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.112(b)(2)(vi)). 
 188  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.112(b)(4)). 
 189  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67889. 
 190  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67891; MILLENSON & MACRI, supra note 146, 
at 4. 
 191  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67889; MILLENSON & MACRI, supra note 146, 
at 4 n.36.  All of these measures are Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Study 
(CAHPS) measures.  MILLENSON & MACRI, supra note 146, at 4 n.36.  “The CAHPS 
program is funded and administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, which works with a consortium of private and public organizations that 
includes . . . CMS” and other federal agencies.  Id. at 4.  “These organizations are 
responsible for conceiving, developing, testing and refining the various CAHPs 
surveys.”  Id. at 4 n.36.  “The CAHPS surveys seek to assess the patient experience of 
care by addressing behaviors the patient directly observes.”  Id. at 2. 
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rules do not require MSSP participants to adopt EHR technology, but 
encourage its adoption by giving it double weight in the calculation 
of a participant’s quality performance score.192  EHR adoption will be 
critical to ACOs’ ability to monitor population health and improve 
quality of care.  The Pioneer ACO model also emphasizes EHR, and 
Pioneer ACOs must ensure that no less than fifty percent of their 
primary care providers are making “meaningful use” of EHR in order 
to receive EHR incentive payments.193 
The three broad categories of MSSP patient-centered criteria are 
a direct response to the lessons learned from the managed care 
backlash and consumerism movement, discussed in Section III.A of 
this Article.  Incorporating these criteria into ACO development 
initiatives and keeping patient engagement at the forefront, whether 
within or outside the MSSP, will allow ACOs to experience greater 
success and allay many of the fears of rationing and improper 
leverage of market power. 
1. The ACO Exit Challenge 
The success of the ACO concept, whether as part of the MSSP or 
in the commercial market, is subject to Hirschman’s “exit, voice, and 
loyalty” theory.194  That is, in unsatisfactory situations, people can 
respond by “exiting” the situation, or raising their “voice” to try and 
remedy the defects.195  Hirschman’s concept of “loyalty” may modify 
the response, causing one to stand and fight rather than exit.196 
 
 192  76 Fed. Reg. at 67802, 67985 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.506). 
 193  PIONEER GENERAL FACT SHEET, supra note 37.  Similar beneficiary-oriented 
provisions guide the Pioneer ACOs: the Pioneer ACO model puts a bit more 
emphasis on beneficiary involvement in the governance structure and requires both 
a beneficiary and a patient advocate to sit on the governing body.  CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PIONEER ACO MODEL: A BETTER CARE EXPERIENCE 
THROUGH A NEW MODEL OF CARE, FACT SHEET (Dec. 19, 2011), available at 
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Pioneer-Model-ACO-Beneficiaries-
Rights-Fact-Sheet.pdf [hereinafter PIONEER BENEFICIARIES FACT SHEET].  Although 
one person may satisfy both positions, most of the initial Pioneer ACOs have separate 
individuals for this responsibility.  Id.  CMS will take an active role in comparing the 
“experience and health of beneficiaries who are aligned to an ACO in the Pioneer 
ACO Model against comparable beneficiaries not aligned to an ACO.”  Id.  CMS will 
actively supervise through service utilization analysis, and investigation of “suspect 
trends” through “beneficiary surveys, audits, and other means.”  Id.; see also Pioneer 
Request, supra note 40.  Additionally, CMS will hold each Pioneer ACO publicly 
accountable by posting on its website a public record of each ACO’s quality results, 
including the results from the patient experience metrics.  Id. 
 194  Hirschman, supra note 13, at 272.  
 195  Id.   
 196  Id. at preface (ed.’s note).  
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Both the MSSP and the commercial market permit patients to 
exit the ACO.197  Medicare beneficiary assignment in the MSSP 
determines the population of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries 
for whose care the ACO is accountable and determines whether an 
ACO has achieved savings under the program.198  The MSSP final rule 
deliberately permits Medicare beneficiaries to exercise free choice in 
determining where to receive health care services.199 
The MSSP further restricts ACO participants from providing 
incentives to beneficiaries to stay within the ACO, and restricts the 
ability of ACO providers to refer to one another.200  Specifically, the 
MSSP rules prohibit ACOs and ACO participants from providing gifts 
or other financial incentives to beneficiaries as inducements for 
receiving items or services from, or remaining in, an ACO.201  The 
rules restrict the ability of MSSP participants to refer beneficiaries to 
other providers and suppliers within the ACO.202  Medicare 
beneficiaries assigned to the ACO are free to express their 
preferences for certain providers and the MSSP rules allow employees 
or contractors of the MSSP participant to make such referrals in 
response to such beneficiary preferences.203 
The freedom to leave an ACO, coupled with the prohibition 
against referrals and financial incentives to entice beneficiaries to 
remain in the ACO, is arguably a response to the managed care 
backlash from the 1990s.  Under the current accountable care 
framework, if ACO patients are disappointed with their experience 
within the ACO, they may leave, or, in the case of an employer-based 
plan, they may lobby their employer to switch health care providers.204  
Exit is a very real concern for organizations that invest significant 
 
 197  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67811. 
 198  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67983 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.400(b)). 
 199  Id. 
 200  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67981 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.304(a)(1)) 
 201  Id.  ACOs, however, may provide in-kind items or services to beneficiaries if 
there is a reasonable connection between the items and services and the medical 
care of the beneficiary and the items or services are preventive care items or services 
or advance a clinical goal for the beneficiary.  Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67981 (to 
be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.304(a)(2)). 
 202  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67981 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.304(c)(2)). 
 203  Id. 
 204  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67956–57. 
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resources into keeping populations healthy.205  For example, 
managed care organizations in the 1990s became critical of health 
promotion and disease prevention efforts.206  The criticism stemmed 
from the assumption that the financial payoffs would not occur until 
“many decades in the future” and would likely “produce their 
primary benefits in savings for other health plans or for Medicare, if 
prevention leads to healthier seniors.”207 
Research regarding employee wellness programs has also 
explored the importance of exit to wellness program success.208  
Specifically, “worksite health promotion programs” are more effective 
with a “captive audience.”209  According to Kenneth Warner, “the 
‘captive’ nature of the [workforce] is an essential feature of effective 
health promotion.”210  The less employee turnover, the more effective 
the health promotion program; whereas high employee turnover, or 
“exit,” undermines the effectiveness of health promotion efforts and 
thereby reduces the potential cost savings.211  As a result, 
organizations that invest in improving patient care through 
prevention and overall wellness must be cognizant of the potential 
for exit and, to the extent possible, design a program to address it. 
2. Success through Building Trust 
The three broad categories of patient-centered criteria 
regarding patient involvement in ACO governance, patient 
engagement processes, and quality measures in the MSSP, strike at 
building and maintaining patient loyalty or trust.  Under the 
Hirschman theory, building “loyalty” can minimize “exit.”212  
 
 205  Kenneth E. Warner, Wellness at the Worksite, 9 HEALTH AFF. 63, 65 (1990). 
 206  Schlesinger, supra note 106, at 34. 
 207  Id.; see also Sheila Leatherman et al., The Business Case for Quality: Case Studies 
and an Analysis, 22 HEALTH AFF. 17, 27 (2003) (noting that managed care 
organizations that implement prevention efforts such as “smoking-cessation 
programs, diabetes care management and risk reduction” likely encounter delayed 
costs savings because of enrollee turnover). 
 208  Warner, supra note 205. 
 209  Id. 
 210  Id.  
 211  Id. 
 212  See generally Hirshman, supra note 13.  Americans, however, may be reluctant 
to provide absolute loyalty; e.g., Hirshman notes that “[t]he traditional American 
idea of success confirms the hold which exit has had on the national imagination.”  
Id. at 274.  Relevantly, he believes that “the ideology of exit has been [so] powerful in 
America” that “the national disbelief in the economist’s notion that a market 
dominated by two or three giant firms departs substantially from the ideal 
competitive model.”  Id.  The ability to “transfer [one’s] allegiance from . . . firm A 
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According to one researcher, patient trust differs from patient 
satisfaction in that “satisfaction refers to the patient’s opinions of the 
physician’s actions” that have already occurred,213 while trust on the 
other hand, “looks forward” to the future “relationship between the 
physician and patient” and “is based largely on perceptions about the 
physician’s motivations.”214  Satisfaction tends to be more objective; 
trust may be more emotional.215  Patients have described trust as a 
reflection of a commitment to an ongoing relationship.216  Thus, 
building trust reaches deeper into the relationship between the 
provider and patient and creates loyalty.217 
Because of the potential for patient exit, building and 
maintaining trust between ACOs and their patients will be vital to 
ACO success.  Trust can help avoid the financial pitfalls experienced 
by managed care organizations and employee wellness programs by 
encouraging the patients to remain in the ACO.218  Research on 
patient trust has shown that, compared to patient satisfaction, trust is 
more strongly associated with treatment adherence and continuity of 
enrollment than patient satisfaction.219 
The MSSP offers ideas on how to build patient trust.  For 
example, the patient engagement processes require ACOs to 
communicate “clinical knowledge” and “evidence-based medicine to 
beneficiaries in a way that is understandable to them.”220  It also 
requires “[b]eneficiary engagement and shared decision-making that 
takes into account the beneficiaries’ unique needs, preferences, 
values, and priorities.”221  The MSSP requires ACOs to coordinate 
patient care by developing “individualized care program[s] . . . “to 
promote improved outcomes for . . . patients.”222  This emphasis on 
individualized care and understandable communication is essential 
 
to . . . firm B” suffices to satisfy the symbolic for exit.  Id. 
 213  David H. Thorn et al., Measuring Patients’ Trust in Physicians When Assessing 
Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF.124, 127 (2004).   
 214  Id. 
 215  Id. 
 216  Id. 
 217  Id. 
 218  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67967. 
 219  Thorn, supra note 213. 
 220  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
§425.112(b)(2)(iv)). 
 221  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
§425.112(b)(2)(v)). 
 222  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
§425.112(b)(4)(ii)). 
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to building trust.  These criteria force ACOs to begin a dialogue with 
patients about their care.  This dialogue can expand to address the 
cost effectiveness of the patient’s care, which can calm fears of 
rationing.223  According to one researcher, patients might be less 
critical of financial incentives once they understand the dilemmas 
associated with rising costs, evidence of widespread overuse of health 
care services, and the challenges of changing physician behavior 
using nonfinancial incentives.224  Undertaking such a dialogue may 
also help develop innovative cost-control strategies that generate less 
patient concern about potential conflicts of interest that ACO 
participants might have with regard to shared savings and other 
financial incentives.225 
Moreover, meaningful patient dialogue creates true partnerships 
in health care, which can translate to better health outcomes.226  
Indeed, a recent article highlighted the effectiveness of the 
Collaborative Chronic Care Network (CCCN), which engages 
chronically ill patients by having them “experiment with new 
treatments and closely monitor[s] how the regimens affect[] them 
day to day.”227  The patients “feed the data into [an] online network 
through computers or smartphones for doctors to examine.”228  Most 
significantly, the CCCN focuses on patient-centered care and allows 
each patient to drive the experimentation.229  According to one of the 
physician participants in the network, getting “the best outcomes” 
requires parents and patients to be true partners.230 
3. Success through Voice 
Creating a dialogue with patients would also give voice to 
patients, which would serve as an antidote to “exit” and achieve 
another MSSP patient-centered requirement of meaningful patient 
involvement in the ACO.231  This dialogue can be accomplished 
 
 223  Gallagher, supra note 115, at 190–91. 
 224  Id. 
 225  Id. at 191. 
 226  Amy Dockser Marcus, Patients as Partners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304692804577281463879153408 
.html. 
 227  Id. 
 228  Id. 
 229  Id.  The network also provides patients with an opportunity for “social 
support,” allowing them to “find[] other patients who share[] similar interests or 
live[] near them.”  Id. 
 230  Id. 
 231  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67976 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
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through the MSSP patient experience of care surveys and patient 
representation in ACO governance.232  The MSSP requires ACOs to 
survey its Medicare patients annually.233  Thus, at least once each year 
MSSP Medicare beneficiaries will have the opportunity to voice their 
concerns about their ACO experience.  The patient experience of 
care surveys should distinguish between more superficial satisfaction 
questions, align with the ACO’s trust-building goal, and convey a 
deeper concern for the patient’s overall health. 
The MSSP quality of care measures that relate to patient-
caregiver experience reinforce the importance of the patient care 
surveys.234  These measures require MSSP participants to give patients 
voice with regard to the timeliness of their care, appointments and 
information, the effectiveness of physician communication, their 
access to specialists, their experience with the ACO health promotion 
and education efforts, their experience with shared decision making, 
and their overall health status and functional status.235  These 
measures offer a wealth of information about the ACO’s effectiveness 
in creating an appealing patient experience.  By learning from 
patients about their overall experience with the ACO and improving 
the experience based on what is learned, the ACO has a better 
chance of retaining patients and gaining new ones because of a 
positive community reputation.236 
Meaningful participation in ACO governance—for example, 
through representation on the ACO governing board—can also give 
a voice to patients.237  Patient representation on boards is related to 
the interest group representation theory of the 1950s and 1960s.238  
The underlying theory of interest group representation states that 
there are different groups with competing interests, and the voices of 
the underrepresented must be inserted into the process so that good 
 
425.106(c)(5)). 
 232  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67976–77 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.106(c)(2), 425.112(b)(2)(i)). 
 233  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67984 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.500(d)). 
 234  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67981, 67984 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
§425.308(e); §425.500). 
 235  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67889. 
 236  Blendon, supra note 99, at 89 (“Health care consumers are much more likely 
to rely on personal experiences or the recommendation of friends and family 
members” when choosing health plans.). 
 237  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67976-77 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.106(c)(2)). 
 238  Trubek, supra note 120. 
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public policy can be constructed.239  The hope is that, by including a 
patient or beneficiary in the board, discussion will lead to fair 
decisions.240 
One can see the effectiveness of voice from the MSSP 
rulemaking process.  The participation of REAP in the rulemaking 
process for the MSSP rules demonstrates the importance of external 
policy advocacy.241  REAP is an alliance for participation in health care 
governance and regulation.242  It is based on the National Patient 
Advocate Program, a national active patient advocacy group.243  
Notably, REAP often supports the comments of the providers and is 
rarely adversarial to many of the physician complaints.244  The alliance 
of disease-based non-profits, such as the American Cancer Society, 
wrote extensive comments on the proposed rules.245  The MSSP Final 
Rule reflects many of the changes proposed by the patient groups as 
well as the providers.246 
Meaningful participation in ACO governance is especially 
important in light of the current lack of such participation, even in 
highly integrated, high quality health care systems.  Representatives 
of the Wisconsin systems expressed a need for patients to have “more 
skin in the game,”247 but none of those systems involved independent 
patients in the system’s governance.248  The Wisconsin systems 
recognized that in the new world of value-based reimbursement, 
patients would not be entitled to every type of treatment available.249  
For example, Dr. Samitt declared that in the new model, “patients 
need to be willing to forgo procedures that don’t work.”250  To 
prevent the backlash experienced from the managed care movement, 
 
 239  Id. 
 240  The effectiveness of consumers on regulatory boards has been questioned.  Id. 
 241  Comment from Regulatory Education and Action for Patients (REAP) to 
Donald Berwick, Administrator, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2010-0259-0425 (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2012) [hereinafter REAP Comment] (in reference to CMS-1345-P: Medicare 
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations). 
 242  REGULATORY EDUC. & ACTION FOR PATIENTS, http://www.reapforum.org/about 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2012). 
 243  See REGULATORY EDUC. & ACTION FOR PATIENTS, supra note 242. 
 244  See REAP Comment, supra note 241.  
 245  See id.; see also REGULATORY EDUC. & ACTION FOR PATIENTS, supra note 242. 
 246  See generally MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802 (Nov. 2, 2011). 
 247  Samitt Interview, supra note 53; Jaffery Interview, supra note 51. 
 248  Samitt Interview, supra note 53; Jaffery Interview, supra note 51. 
 249  Samitt Interview, supra note 53. 
 250  Id. 
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however, it will be important for these systems to do more than just 
instruct patients to be more responsible.  These systems must engage 
patients in meaningful dialogue, including involving patients in ACO 
governance who are not otherwise affiliated with the ACO through 
employment or family, for example.  Such actions will help build the 
trust needed for ACOs to succeed. 
 4. Success through Community Partnerships and Care 
Coordination 
Care coordination with other healthcare stakeholders is another 
patient engagement process that can engender trust, not only with 
individual patients, but with entire communities.  Specifically, the 
MSSP rules require participants to partner with community 
stakeholders to improve the health of the community’s population.251  
The rules also require participants to coordinate care across the 
spectrum of providers throughout an episode of care and during its 
transitions, such as discharge from a hospital or transfer of care from 
a primary care physician to a specialist (both inside and outside the 
ACO).252 
Creating partnerships with community stakeholders outside the 
ACO, such as public health agencies, families, workplaces, spiritual 
leaders, and mental health providers, will facilitate an ACO’s ability 
to move away from the current fragmented system and focus on the 
patient’s overall well-being, not just the patient’s health condition.  
Partnerships compel participants to view health as part of an 
integrated whole.  ACOs can accomplish such partnerships through 
counseling programs, where trained counselors meet with patients 
and ask patients questions about their quality of life and how their 
health impacts that quality.253  For example, Women Breathe Free is a 
program in which “nurse health educators provide regular telephone 
counseling for patients, talking to them about their particular asthma 
concerns, such as problems related to household cleaning or laundry 
products and the use of” certain medications that “can exacerbate 
 
 251  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67977 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. § 425.112(b)(2)(iii)(A)). 
 252  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
452.112(b)(4)). 
 253  See, e.g., Laura Landro, The Simple Idea That Is Transforming Health Care, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 16, 2012, at R1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304450004577275911370551798 
.html. 
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problems.”254  Patients in the program “reported higher levels of 
asthma-related quality of life and a greater reduction in the use of 
certain medications.”255  Participants also missed fewer “days of school 
and work”.256 
Partnerships with mental health providers will also be a critical 
part of coordinating care to improve health outcomes and reduce 
costs.  According to the report of one Wisconsin health care 
organization, “when behavioral health services are appropriately 
integrated with medical services, better patient outcomes and cost 
reductions of 20 to 30 percent are possible.”257  For example, 
Intermountain Healthcare found that by treating depressed patients 
using a mental health integration care model, the average per-patient 
allowed charges increased less than patients whose depression went 
unaddressed.258  In addition, integrating behavioral health with 
primary care clinics improves the ability to coordinate care, improves 
patient engagement in behavioral health care, and enhances overall 
patient experience.259 
By taking responsibility for the whole patient, ACOs can 
minimize the perception of market abuses and cherry-picking of 
healthy enrollees that tainted the managed care movement.260  Rather 
than pushing conditions that traditionally fell outside the medical 
model, such as substance abuse or mental illness, onto other 
 
 254  Id. 
 255  Id. 
 256  Id. 
 257  William Henricks, Behavioral Health Integration: The Right Prescription for 
Healthcare, ROGERS PARTNERS IN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH UPDATE (Mar. 2012) (on file with 
the author) (citing N. Cummings et al., The Financial Dimension of Integrated 
Behavioral/Primary Care, in UNDERSTANDING THE BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE CRISIS 
(Cummings & O’Donohue, eds., 2011). 
 258  Henricks, supra note 257 (citing B. Reiss-Brennan, Cost and Quality Impact of 
Intermountain’s Mental Health Integration Program, 55 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 1, 1–18 
(2010)). 
 259  Henricks, supra note 257 (citing S. Bartles, Improving Access to Geriatric Mental 
Health Services: A Randomized Trial Comparing Treatment Engagement with Integrated versus 
Enhanced Referral Care for Depression, Anxiety, and At-Risk Alcohol Use, 161 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1455, 1455–62 (2004)); see also Jean M. Cassidy et al., Behavioral Healthcare 
Integration in Obstetrics & Gynecology, MEDSCAPE GENERAL MEDICINE (May 15, 2003), 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14603140 (emphasizing the need 
for the inclusion and integration of services that identify, treat and medically manage 
behavioral health issues in the practice of obstetrics and gynecology). 
 260  Schlesinger, supra note 106, at 32–33 (citing D. R. GERSTEIN & H. J. HARWOOD, 
TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS (1990) (stating that managed care organizations failed to 
treat substance abuse, leaving the costs to “fall on employers, family members or the 
criminal justice system”)). 
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community stakeholders such as employers, families, and the 
criminal justice system, ACOs can partner with these stakeholders to 
help treat the whole person.261  Community stakeholders that see a 
sincere interest in improving population health, as the MSSP rules 
require, are less likely to criticize large collaborations of health care 
providers.  Moreover, larger collaborations of providers and 
community partners may be more effective in improving population 
health, lending legal justification for certain mergers and joint 
ventures.  This approach is similar to the FTC’s approach to “clinical 
integration” programs that improve quality and reduce costs through 
interdependent and cooperative multi-provider collaborations.262  
Legitimate clinical integration is likely to survive antitrust scrutiny 
from the FTC.263 
For true collaborative care to occur and succeed, patients, along 
with employers and insurers, must be part of the equation and be just 
as willing to sacrifice and change the status quo.264  For example, 
employers can encourage healthy activities such as smoking cessation 
programs and exercise.265  In Wisconsin, many insurers offer partial 
rebates on health activities, such as participation in exercise 
programs and community-supported agriculture shares programs.266  
The concept of patient responsibility and engagement was not part of 
the managed care movement in the 1990s, but it must be part of the 
current ACO movement if it is to succeed.267  Consumer engagement 
is at the front end of ACO development rather than a response to 
managed care with the Patient Bill of Rights. 
B. The MSSP Legal Roadmap to Reduce Abusive Practices 
The MSSP provides a legal framework in which participating 
organizations can operate.  In part, this legal framework addresses 
 
 261  Schlesinger, supra note 106, at 32–33. 
 262  J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed.Trade Comm’n, Clinical Integration in 
Antitrust: Prospects for the Future, Remarks at the Am. Bar Assoc. 2007 Antitrust in 
Healthcare Conference, 7 (Sept. 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch.shtm. 
 263  Id. at 8–10 (citing two F.T.C. Advisory Opinion Letters regarding MedSouth 
and Suburban Health Organization); see also Rosch, supra note 101. 
 264  Samitt Interview, supra note 53; Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52. 
 265  Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52. 
 266  For example, in Wisconsin, local HMOs provide partial rebates to subscribers 
for purchasing Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) shares.  See, e.g., FAIRSHARE 
CSA COALITION, http://www.csacoalition.org/our-work/csa-insurance-rebate/ (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 267  Sanders Interview, supra note 54. 
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the abusive market practice fears expressed by Greaney.  Softening 
the usual legal restrictions concerning health care organization 
collaboration provides additional incentives for health care 
organizations to adopt the MSSP concept, which DHHS will monitor, 
as opposed to operating in the commercial ACO world only.268  For 
example, MSSP participants receive certain waivers of the physician 
self-referral law and the federal anti-kickback statute, including 
waivers for ACO participation, shared savings distributions, 
compliance with the Physician Self-Referral Law, and patient 
incentives.269  Additionally, MSSP participants are afforded some 
protection against antitrust concerns, in order to allow 
collaboration.270 
With regard to anti-trust concerns, such as those raised by 
Greaney, the FTC and the DOJ provided guidance for ACOs that are 
eligible and intend to, or have been approved to, operate in the 
MSSP.271  The guidance is also useful for ACOs that intend to operate 
in the commercial market.272  The guidance states that an ACO will be 
evaluated by the antitrust agencies under the “rule of reason 
analysis,” which evaluates “whether the collaboration is likely to have 
anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the collaboration’s 
potential for procompetitive efficiencies are likely to outweigh those 
effects.”273  The guidance creates an antitrust safety zone for ACOs in 
the MSSP.274  Specifically, independent ACO participants that provide 
a common service must have a combined share of thirty percent or 
less of each common service in each participant’s primary service 
area, wherever two or more ACO participants provide that service to 
patients from that primary service area.275  ACOs that “exceed the 30 
 
 268  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67840 (Nov. 2, 2011); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice, Final Policy Statement: Statement of Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026-32 (Oct. 28, 2011) 
[hereinafter Antitrust Enforcement Policy]. 
 269  Interim Final Rule: Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings 
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67992-01 (Nov. 2, 2011). 
 270  See Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026. 
 271  Id.   
 272  Id. 
 273  Id. at 67027. 
 274  Id. at 67026. 
 275  Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67031.  Calculating the primary 
service area (PSA) for an ACO is complex.  For each participant in an ACO, and 
each service provided by that participant, a “primary service area (PSA)” is defined as 
“the lowest number of postal zip codes from which the ACO participant draws at least 
75 percent of its patients.”  Id.  The ACO has a share in the PSA of a participant 
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percent primary service area share may still fall within the safety zone 
if [they qualify] for a ‘rural exception.’”276  ACOs with a dominant 
participant—for example, with a greater than fifty percent share in its 
primary service area—may also fall within the safety zone.277  These 
ACOs are granted access to the safety zone only if: (1) there are no 
other ACO participants that provide the common service in that 
primary service area; and (2) the dominant participant does not 
require private payers to contract exclusively with the ACO or 
otherwise restrict private payers’ ability to contract or deal with other 
provider networks or ACOs.278 
This relaxed standard of review is being accorded to ACOs in the 
MSSP and Pioneer programs because the antitrust agencies view the 
MSSP rules as generally consistent with clinical and financial 
integration efforts that they have approved in the past.279  For 
example, the FTC and DOJ have approved of physician or multi-
provider joint ventures that share substantial financial risk for the 
purpose of achieving overall efficiency for the venture.280  The 
agencies have also approved joint ventures that “implement an active 
and ongoing program to evaluate and modify practice patterns by the 
venture’s providers and [that] create a high degree of 
interdependence and cooperation among the providers to control 
costs and ensure quality.”281  The agencies consider organizations that 
meet MSSP requirements to be “reasonably likely to be bona fide 
arrangements intended to improve the quality, and reduce the costs, 
of providing medical and other health care services through their 
participants’ joint efforts.”282  Thus, closely following the MSSP 
requirements, like the patient-centered criteria, may help ACOs 
outside the MSSP avoid scrutiny by the FTC and DOJ. 
The legal waivers and safety zones, however, do not provide carte 
blanche protection against antitrust issues.  ACOs under both MSSP 
 
when that participant provides services for the ACO.  Id. 
 276  Id. at 67029.  The “rural exception” applies when the “physician’s or physician 
group practice’s primary office is in a zip code that is classified as ‘isolated rural’ or 
‘other small rural.’”  Id. 
 277  Id. 
 278  Id.  
 279  Rosch, supra note 101, at 4 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE, at Statement 8 
(1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/policy/index 
.htm). 
 280  Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026–27. 
 281  Id. 
 282  Id. 
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and Pioneer must still take care to avoid garnering more than fifty 
percent of the market share in a specific primary service area.283  
Moreover, regardless of an ACO’s primary service area shares or 
other indicia of market power, ACOs should avoid improper 
exchanges of prices or other competitively sensitive information 
among competing participants.284  They should also avoid: (1) 
preventing or discouraging private payers from directing or 
incentivizing patients to choose certain providers through anti-
steering, anti-tiering, guaranteed inclusion, most-favored-nation, or 
similar contractual clauses or provisions; (2) tying sales of the ACO’s 
services to the private payer’s purchase of other services from 
providers outside the ACO (and vice versa); (3) contracting on an 
exclusive basis with ACO physicians, hospitals, ambulatory surgery 
centers or other providers, thereby preventing or discouraging those 
providers from contracting with private payers outside the ACO; and 
(4) restricting a private payer’s ability to make available to its health 
plan enrollees cost, quality, efficiency, and performance information 
to aid enrollees in evaluating and selecting providers in the health 
plan, if that information is similar to the cost, quality, efficiency, and 
performance measures used in the MSSP.285  In essence, regardless of 
MSSP participation, all ACOs may minimize the chance of legal 
challenges by adopting MSSP elements and goals, particularly the 
MSSP’s patient-centered criteria. 
C. The MSSP Can Help “Spread” Accountable Care Using Multitier 
Governance 
The MSSP framework is multi-tier—local organizations placed in 
a national framework. MSSP created a national framework to 
encourage the formation of coordinated, collaborative local health 
care delivery.  The framework allows for variation in the ACOs so that 
they can respond to and respect local conditions.  The variation in 
the local organizations allows for learning across the ACOs regionally 
and nationally. 
1. The National Framework 
The MSSP program provides the national government with 
 
 283 See Pioneer Request, supra note 40 (stating an understanding that the Antitrust 
Policy Statement designed for MSSP ACOs would also apply to Pioneer ACOs); see 
also 76 Fed. Reg. 67026–27.   
 284  76 Fed. Reg. 67026–28. 
 285  Id. at 67030. 
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leverage to bring up lagging states and health care providers to join 
in the accountable care movement.  This ability to pull up “laggards” 
is important for states and providers taking the lead on transitioning 
to a value-based payment system.286  For example, about sixty percent 
of Wisconsin providers have been cooperating in self-monitoring 
practices through the WHCQ.287  This cooperation helps to minimize 
the need for governmental mandates.  Yet many Wisconsin practices, 
particularly small practices and specialty clinics, consider cooperative 
self-monitoring to be a low priority, and have no “business reason to 
do this absent a mandate.”288  The refusal of “stragglers” to participate 
creates an unfair and uneven marketplace.289  As a result, some 
Wisconsin healthcare industry stakeholders believe that government 
intervention is necessary.290  For example, when collecting provider 
quality data, some health care providers refuse to submit data to the 
repository.291  According to one health care leader, such unequal 
commitment to measuring quality may require “legislative action to 
assure that all providers are reporting.”292 
The need to “scale up” can be seen in the national framework—
it includes incentives and tools to encourage value care and flexibility 
for local conditions.  The hope of shared savings provides a financial 
incentive.293 Other tools encourage improving value—use of 
electronic records, metrics, stakeholder participation, and 
benchmarks.294  The framework also reduces the barriers to the 
formation of ACOs such as anti-trust concerns and potential fraud 
and abuse violations.295  The MSSP rule continues fee-for-service, 
 
 286  See, e.g., Tanja A. Borzel, Why there is no ‘Southern Problem’: On Environmental 
Leaders and Laggards in the European Union, 7 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 141, 147–49, 158–60 
(2000), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/135017600343313 (discussing how 
“domestic mobilization by social actors” can “pull” the “laggard” states to comply with 
European Union policy). 
 287  Queram Interview, supra note 76. 
 288  Id. 
 289  Id. 
 290  Id. 
 291  Toussaint, supra note 49; Queram Interview, supra note 76. 
 292  Toussaint, supra note 49, at e88. 
 293  MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. 67802, 67985–87 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. §§ 425.600–04). 
 294  MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67975–76, 67984–85 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
§§ 425.106, 425.500, 425.506, 425.602). 
 295  See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: 
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1304–05 (May 2012) (describing methods that lawmakers use to 
“induce, facilitate, and monitor contextualizing regimes”). 
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makes the program voluntary, and allows choice of physicians.296  This 
framework encourages the slow movers to consider the move to value-
based care.297 
The MSSP provides a national method to encourage those who 
are not “early movers” by leveraging Medicare.298  Medicare is 
essential because it is a national program, in contrast to Medicaid, 
which is controlled at the state level.  Part of this acceleration process 
is occurring in specific ways.  For example, the CMS Innovation 
Center has created the “Advance Payment ACO Model,” to which 
certain organizations can apply to receive advance payments to 
establish an ACO.299  CMS created this program partly in response to 
comments regarding the proposed MSSP rule.300  This model removes 
funding barriers for certain organizations to enter into the ACO 
arena.301  The MSSP also allows fee-for-service billing to continue.  
Both of these provisions encourage health care providers to make the 
move to coordinated care while preserving some aspects of the 
traditional volume-based model.302  CMS is also driving the linking of 
patient satisfaction to provider compensation—surveys, report cards, 
and the creation of well-validated quality metrics.303  Finally, the MSSP 
“safety zone” provides a legal basis that can be used to align with 
commercial programs.304 
 
 296  MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67975 (to be codified as 42 C.F.R. § 425.100). 
 297  Jaffery Interview, supra note 51. 
 298  Id. 
 299  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ADVANCE PAYMENT ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
ORGANIZATION MODEL FACT SHEET, (Oct. 20, 2011), available at 
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Advance-Payment-Model-ACO-Fact-
Sheet.pdf [hereinafter ADVANCE PAYMENT ACO FACT SHEET]. 
 300  Id. 
 301  Id. 
 302  Note that certain providers may not participate in the MSSP, at least initially. 
MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §425.114(a)).  
Under section § 425.114(a), participation in the Shared Savings Program is not 
permitted if one of the ACO participants “participates in the independence at home 
medical practice pilot program under section 1866E of the Act, a model tested or 
expanded under section 1115A of the Act that involves shared savings, or any other 
Medicare initiative that involves shared savings” such as the PGP, or the Pioneer ACO 
model.  Id.  Yet the models are fluid, and participants in one may subsequently switch 
to the other.  See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PIONEER/MEDICARE 
SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM APPLICATION CROSSWALK http://www.cms.gov/Medicare 
/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/Crosswalk 
_Instructions-Pioneer_Applicants.pdf (last viewed Oct. 6, 2012). 
 303  MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67976 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.112). 
 304  MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. at 67840–44, 67977 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
425.202). 
ZABAWA ET AL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2012  2:27 PM 
2012] ADOPTING ACCOUNTABLE CARE 1511 
 
The ACA has carefully carved out a space for the ACO amid the 
existing regulations for health care organizations at the federal and 
state levels.  Like other related provisions within the ACA, the MSSP 
concept of ACOs builds on ideas that have already succeeded in a 
variety of pilot and experimental programs.  Some projects that have 
provided proof of concept for components of the MSSP ACO 
include: Physician Group Practice (PGP),305 Medicaid Section 115 
Waiver,306 Section 1315 Waiver,307 Medicare Disproportionate Share 
Hospital Scheme,308 and Medicare Health Care Quality.309 
   The national framework allows for ongoing monitoring and 
feedback.  The enthusiasm for ACOs is largely based on their 
perceived ability to reduce costs and provide improved care.310  The 
expansion to a national scale makes oversight and shared learning 
essential.  In the difficult conversion to ACOs, there is likely to be 
confusion and backsliding.  The ACO rules do provide for auditing 
and feedback, and careful attention to these oversight functions is 
essential. 
2. Diffusing the ACO Model 
New Jersey’s adoption of accountable care models after other 
states exemplifies discursive diffusion.  Discursive diffusion theory 
suggests that various processes, including financial incentives, public 
discussion of waste and excessive costs, and evidence of 
geographically based poor outcomes, subtly transform national 
discourse and thus local organizations.311  Diffusion is encouraged by 
the national frameworks that create the incentives to allow moving 
healthcare organizations to view the new concepts as practical.312  
Discursive diffusion allows leaders to diffuse their models to laggards 
through these various mechanisms.  For example, when reports are 
 
 305  See Benefits Improvement and Protection Act, § 412, Pub. L. No. 106-554 
(2000). 
 306  See Social Security Act,§ 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006); see also Waivers, 
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/03 
_Research&DemonstrationProjects-Section1115.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2012). 
 307  See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2006). 
 308  See §§ 1395–1395ii. 
 309  Medicare Health Care Quality (MHCQ), 42 U.S.C. § 1866C(b), added by 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) § 
646 (Pub. L. 108-173), and amended by ACA  §3021(c) (2010). 
 310  For a cautionary paper, see generally Mantel, supra note 148. 
 311  David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of 
Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination, 11 EUR. L. J. 343, 357 (2005). 
 312  Id. 
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written in terms set by new models of care, new concepts with 
definitions of reality embedded in them come to be accepted at all 
levels.313  The role of consultants who widely advertise and indicate 
their ability to transform an existing organization into an ACO 
contributes to the diffusion, especially with the availability of websites 
and electronic information.314  The Brookings-Dartmouth ACO 
Learning Network Services is one example.315  It offers webinars, 
implementation work groups, member-driven conferences, and 
online tools and resources.316 The MSSP encourages extensive use of 
metrics and benchmarks.317  When healthcare providers see their 
performance benchmarked against others and against guidelines, 
“they must confront new policy paradigms and take on broad new 
concepts and vocabularies.”318 
A number of the Wisconsin health care organizations expressed 
a desire to serve as leaders in the ACO movement and therefore set 
the benchmarks that others should follow.  For example, George 
Kerwin, Chief Executive Officer of Bellin, stated that he hopes to 
share Bellin’s experience as a Pioneer ACO with other entities not 
part of the pioneer system.319  Dean expressed having aspirations of 
national leadership.320  Marshfield Clinic noted that it would rather be 
in control of implementing solutions to health care problems rather 
than responding to ultimatums.321  Interestingly, this desire to lead is 
occurring despite the assumption that organizations that already 
operate in an efficient, high-quality manner will likely lose money in 
the short-term.322  It is through leadership like that aspired to by 
 
 313  Id. 
 314  See, e.g., The Brookings-Dartmouth Partnership, DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH 
POLICY & CLINICAL PRACTICE, http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/health 
/about-us/collaborations (last visited Oct. 6, 2012). 
 315  Id. 
 316  Id. 
 317  MSSP Final Rule, Fed. Reg. 67802, 67976 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. § 425.112). 
 318  Trubek & Trubek, supra note 311. 
 319  Kerwin Presentation, supra note 58. 
 320  Samitt Interview, supra note 53. 
 321  Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52; see also Toussaint, supra note 49 
(noting that Wisconsin’s implementation of health care quality measures and 
information sharing among Wisconsin providers and insurers has been voluntary and 
consensus driven but that at some point, it may be necessary for legislative action to 
assure that all providers comply with reporting expectations). 
 322  Thompson Presentation, supra note 58 (noting that Gundersen’s care 
coordination program is not compatible in the current payment system and causes 
Gundersen to lose approximately $10 million in charges each year that the system 
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Wisconsin health care organizations that will help diffuse best 
practices in the ACO model. 
3. Learning Across ACOs 
In addition to the vertical interaction between the local ACOs 
and the MSSP national framework, interaction between the ACOs 
and the community at the local level, and between ACOs around the 
country, are important dimensions.  The flexibility and variety among 
the local ACOs permits and requires learning across regions.323  The 
multi-tier structure was pioneered in the disease-management 
programs, and promoted in the community health centers.324  These 
programs rely on regional communication across clinics to share data 
and successes and failures. These horizontal networks contribute to 
the success of the programs.325 
V. ADOPTION OF THE MSSP AND OTHER ACO MODELS POST-ACA 
Since the passage of the ACA, the rapid adoption of ACO 
models is notable.  Wisconsin and New Jersey, the two states that are 
part of this study, demonstrate this rapid adoption.  All the Wisconsin 
providers examined for this paper expressed a belief that they were 
providing accountable care before the ACA created a statutory 
mandate for the MSSP.  Although take-up of the MSSP among 
Wisconsin providers has been quite diverse, the MSSP has appeared 
to fuel the already-existing interest in the ACO concept.  Dean 
Health System was selected along with Bellin to participate as a 
“Pioneer ACO,” but only Bellin decided to move forward with that 
option.326  Bellin’s Chief Executive Officer stated that Bellin moved 
forward with the Pioneer ACO model for several reasons: (1) it had 
been participating in the Medicare Advantage program, which has a 
similar capitated reimbursement model to the Pioneer ACO model; 
(2) the Medicare fee-for-service population consisted of twenty-seven 
 
could have otherwise billed).  
 323  See Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Health Care Governance in 
Transition, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 395, 412 (2003). 
 324  Id. 
 325  Id. 
 326  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEET ON THE PIONEER 
ACCOUNTABLE CARE MODEL (Dec. 19, 2011), available at 
http://innovations.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/Pioneer-ACO-General-Fact-Sheet.pdf 
(listing Bellin Thedacare Healthcare Partners as one of thirty-two Pioneer ACOs).  
Allina Health, a Minnesota health care system that serves Minnesota and Western 
Wisconsin, is also one of the thirty-two Pioneer ACOs, but is not discussed in this 
Article because it is based in Minnesota.  Id. 
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percent of Bellin’s total population, which is a significant enough 
number to make a difference, but not so significant that it would 
cause Bellin to collapse if the Pioneer ACO model fails to work; and 
(3) to better compete in the crowded Northeast Wisconsin healthcare 
provider market.327 
Dean decided to pursue the two-sided risk ACO model instead of 
the Pioneer ACO model in part because it was not servicing Medicare 
Advantage patients and therefore would not be ready to launch a 
capitated model with Medicare patients by January 1, 2012, the start 
of the first Pioneer ACO performance period.328  Dean fully intends, 
however, to become a Pioneer ACO at some point in the future.329  
Marshfield Clinic opted to continue its participation in the Medicare 
Physician Group Practice (PGP) demonstration, in which it was one 
of two physician groups who experienced shared savings in each year 
of the five-year demonstration period.330  The other eight physician 
groups did not experience shared savings in all five years.331  Finally, 
although the Monroe Clinic is excited about the concept of 
accountable care, it has decided to take the “wait and see” approach 
with regard to adopting any accountable care model, either within 
the MSSP or outside of it.332 
In New Jersey, the MSSP is contributing to increased attention to 
collaborative, coordinated care.  The prominent example of 
accountable care development in New Jersey is the New Jersey-based 
legislation for Medicaid ACOs.333  A reformist physician in Camden, 
 
 327  Kerwin Presentation, supra note 58 (noting that the approximately one 
million people living in Northeast Wisconsin can choose from Aurora, Affinity, 
Prevea/St. Vincent and St. Mary’s, as well as Bellin). 
 328  Dr. Craig Samitt, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Dean Health System, 
Presentation at ACO Innovators Symposium (Feb. 22, 2012). 
 329  Id. 
 330  Van Den Heuvel Interview, supra note 52; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., BROCHURE ON MEDICARE PHYSICIAN GROUP PRACTICE DEMONSTRATION 4 (July 
2011), available at https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/PGP 
_Fact_Sheet.pdf [hereinafter PGP FACT SHEET]. 
 331  Id. at 4–6. 
 332  The March 2012 opening of a new building received priority over other plans 
to align physician compensation with global reimbursement initiatives.  Sanders 
Interview, supra note 54. 
 333  Legislative findings and declarations; accountable care organization (ACO) 
models as a tool to improve health care, N.J.S.A. § 30:4D-8.1 (2011); John V. Jacobi, 
Presentation at the Seton Hall Law Review ACO Symposium: Implementing the 
Affordable Care Act: What Role for Accountable Care Organizations? (Oct. 28, 
2011), available at http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/11/02/livestream-
podcast-seton-hall-law-review-aco-symposium/; Jeffrey Brenner, Founder and 
Executive Director of the Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers, Presentation at 
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New Jersey, in cooperation with local hospitals, developed a program 
to serve high-cost, low-income patients through innovative tools.334  A 
law professor, public interest lawyer, and physicians formed a group 
to enact statewide legislation to encourage this type of organization 
that they also termed an accountable care organization.335  Though 
significantly different from the MSSP model, the legislation, with the 
aid of business support, provides a framework for developing other 
community-based ACOs in New Jersey.336  This legislation encourages 
a community organizing approach.337  While the incentives to develop 
the New Jersey Medicaid ACO are based on the low reimbursement 
rates for Medicaid and the substantial inequality in health care, 
calling it an “ACO” helped the legislation to pass.338  The use of the 
ACO name also contributes to a more general acceleration of the 
transformation of health care organizations throughout the state.339 
The commercial sector is demonstrating interest.  The Blue 
Cross Blue Shield plan in New Jersey is participating in an acquisition 
of a communication network in order to “transform the delivery of 
health care in our country.”340  The Chief Executive Officer of the 
information technology company Lumeris stated that “[t]his 
innovative cloud-based solution will be fundamental to the success of 
payer-led accountable care initiatives nationwide.”341  Another 
initiative is the increasing formation of multispecialty practices.  One 
 
the Seton Hall Law Review ACO Symposium: Implementing the Affordable Care Act: 
What Role for Accountable Care Organizations? (Oct. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/11/02/livestream-podcast-seton-hall-law-
review-aco-symposium [hereinafter Brenner Presentation]. 
 334  Gawande, supra note 134. 
 335  Renee Steinhagen, John V. Jacobi, & Jeffrey Brenner, Presentations at the 
Seton Hall Law Review ACO Symposium: Implementing the Affordable Care Act: 
What Role for Accountable Care Organizations?  (Oct. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2011/11/02/livestream-podcast-seton-hall-law-
review-aco-symposium/. 
 336  Joel C. Cantor, Opinion: A Tale of Two ACOs, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/12/0206/1910/. 
 337  Brenner Presentation, supra note 335. 
 338  Cantor, supra note 336. 
 339  See id.; see generally Elizabeth G. Litten, ACOs: Getting More for Less, 204 N.J.L.J. 
522 (2011). 
 340 Blue Plans and Lumeris Complete Acquisition of Nation’s Largest Real-Time Health 
Care Communications Network, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/blue-plans-and-lumeris-complete-acquisition-of-
nations-largest-real-time-health-care-communication-network-2012-03-14 (quoting 
Daniel J. Hilferty, President and Chief Executive Officer of Independence Blue 
Cross). 
 341  Id. 
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article describing the initiation of these practices in New Jersey stated 
that “[s]uch group practices are being formed across the country as 
the government and health-insurance industry shift to paying for care 
based on the value of service rather than the volume of services.”342 
Nationwide, by the end of 2011, nearly one hundred health care 
organizations were developing contracts with private health plans 
based on an accountable care model, which included tying payment 
to improving patient care across the continuum and reducing overall 
spending growth.343 
VI. LOOKING AHEAD: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The transformative change to value-based care is underway, led 
by MSSP and joined by private payers.  As the movement picks up 
steam, one challenge is whether governance through the national 
framework, horizontal sharing by ACOs, and patient-centeredness 
will be sufficient to move value-based care  forward.  The MSSP 
national framework may not supply adequate monitoring and 
measuring oversight.344  For example, it is not clear how the MSSP 
framework as currently designed will provide oversight for private 
payers.345  The rules do not provide tools or guidance to encourage 
sharing of knowledge and resources.  There is no encouragement for 
horizontal linkages in the MSSP rules.  In their filing with CMS, the 
REAP group noted the absence in the rules of encouragement for 
regional and statewide horizontal links.346  The patient-centered goal 
has real limits in how it is framed.  There are no requirements for 
participation in community planning for healthcare.347  The group 
representation of patient interests is placed exclusively in the patient 
representative on the ACO governing board.348 
  Another challenge is the integration of ACOs into broader 
health care policy.  As ACOs create their own internal organization, 
 
 342  Post, supra note 89. 
 343  Elliott S. Fisher et al., Building the Path to Accountable Care, 365 NEW ENGL. J. 
MED. 2445, 2445 (2011). 
 344  Elliot Fisher & Stephen Shortell, ACOs: Making Sure We Learn From Experience, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Blog/2012/Apr/ACOs-Making-Sure-We-Learn-
from-Experience.aspx. 
 345  Id. 
 346  REAP Comment, supra note 242. 
 347  See 76 Fed. Reg. at 67802-21; Brenner Presentation, supra note 338. 
 348  MSSP Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67976 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. §425.106(c)(2)). 
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will they make sure to integrate into broader medical, geographic, 
and patient networks?  External networks that monitor stakeholder 
involvement are important.  Some networks form to work on policy.349  
Others form to work on participation in delivery of services.350  These 
networks can operate bottom-up or top-down.351  These groups can 
provide support for the embedding and developing of effective 
patient engagement at all levels, from the local ACOs to the national 
framework.  Three examples of the value of such external advocacy 
are: (1) patient participation in managed care in Wisconsin,352 (2) 
community organizing in New Jersey,353 and (3) REAP in the ACO 
rules debate.354  In Wisconsin, the patient participation occurred in 
the initial passage of legislation encouraging MCO development.355  
After the national backlash against managed care organizations, 
Patients’ Bills of Rights were promoted.356  In Wisconsin, some 
physicians and patient groups united to work on the Wisconsin 
version.357  While separate ACOs are competing in the market, 
collaborative efforts to maintain and improve the model, such as the 
Wisconsin example, are essential.  These external local collaborations 
of physicians, community providers, and patient groups can provide 
training for patient representatives, provide information on 
community needs, and link to ACOs in other locations. 
 External stakeholders such as the National Committee for 
Quality Assurance, national patient advocacy groups, and major 
ACOs can develop a network that can facilitate learning across the 
ACOs.  Fisher and Shortell suggest such groups can gather 
information on successes and failures in contract design, 
organizational capabilities, impact on patients, and impact on 
 
 349  See, e.g., Elliott Fisher, Research, The Dartmouth Inst. for Health Pol’y & 
Clinical Res., Geisel School of Med. at Dartmouth, available at 
http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/initiatives/accountable-care-organizations/research. 
 350  See, e.g., iPhysicianHub & ACO Services, iPHYSICIANHUB, 
http://iphysicianhub.com/HubContent/PhysicianHubAndACOServices.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 351  See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 311.  
 352  See supra section II.B.1 and notes 49 and 76. 
 353  See supra section II.B.2 and notes 91 and 94. 
 354  See REGULATORY EDUCATION & ACTION FOR PATIENTS, supra note 242. 
 355  Louise G. Trubek, Making Managed Competition a Social Arena: Strategies for 
Action, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 275, 298 (1994).; Queram Interview, supra note 76. 
 356  Patient Rights and Resolution of Patient Grievances, WIS. ADMIN. CODE D.H.S. 
§§ 94.01–94.54 (2010) (providing for administrative regulation of patient rights in 
Wisconsin). 
 357  Trubek, supra note 120, 591–92. 
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community-level heath and costs.358  These groups can do this, in part, 
by monitoring how well the private and public payers are producing 
the data and making the data transparent.359  However, Fisher and 
Shortell admit that there are major challenges to track performance 
at both the ACO level and the community level: “Without 
community-level aggregation, we will be hard pressed to know 
whether the new payment model is having an impact on what 
matters: the quality of affordability of care and the health of our 
communities.”360 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The MSSP is not a panacea for all of the nation’s ills in health 
care delivery and payment, but it holds much promise for achieving 
the goals of better health, better care, and lower costs.  It is evident 
that the MSSP has incorporated lessons learned from the managed 
care and consumerism movements, particularly with including 
patient-centered criteria so that patients are engaged in ACO 
development and operation at the outset.  The MSSP patient-
centered criteria can serve as a model for all ACOs that wish to attain 
patient buy-in and ultimately, the full financial benefit of a value-
based payment health care system.  The MSSP also furnishes a 
framework for the ACO movement to spread across providers who 
can learn from one another, set new standards, and unify the 
fragmented system around providing all patients with high quality 
care at lower costs. 
 
 
 358  Fisher & Shortell, supra note 344. 
 359  Id. 
 360  Id.  
